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Implementing a Public Health Perspective in 
FDA Drug Regulation 
PATRICIA J. ZETTLER, MARGARET FOSTER RILEY, AND 
AARON S. KESSELHEIM* 
ABSTRACT 
There is, without question, a public health crisis in the United States arising from 
both illicit and prescription opioid misuse, addiction, and overdose. The Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) is one regulator with an important role to play in 
minimizing the harms associated with prescription opioids, while also ensuring that 
prescription opioids are available for the evidence-based management of pain. One 
question, however, is to what extent the agency can consider in its decisions to 
approve opioids and keep existing ones on the market the provider and patient 
behaviors contributing to the epidemic. This is, in part, because FDA’s approval of 
drugs is often understood as narrowly focused on weighing the benefits and risks of 
the products as defined in the preapproval clinical trials that are used to set the drug’s 
official FDA-approved indication. Such a limited focus would exclude important 
information about the real-world use and public-health impact of prescription opioids 
and other drugs with externalities. This Article argues that, to better regulate drugs 
like opioids that have such externalities, one step FDA should take is to use a “public 
health” perspective in its approval (and withdrawal) decisions. The Article describes 
how the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act authorizes FDA to take this broad 
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approach in its drug approval and withdrawal decisions and offers some principles 
for implementing this approach systematically. 
INTRODUCTION 
Although the steady increase in opioid prescribing that began in the 1990s has 
now begun to decrease, opioid prescribing in the United States remains high, far 
beyond prescribing rates in comparable countries around the world.1 In 2015, the 
amount of morphine milligram equivalents prescribed per capita was approximately 
three times as high as it was in 1999,2 and about 300 million opioid prescriptions 
were written.3 Alongside this high level of prescribing, the United States has also 
experienced a dramatic increase in opioid misuse, addiction, and overdose over the 
past two decades—with opioids causing over 42,000 deaths in 2016, and prescription 
opioids contributing to about 40% of those deaths.4 Minimizing the harms associated 
with both prescription and illicit opioids that have given rise to this crisis,5 while also 
ensuring that prescription opioids are available for the evidence-based management 
of pain, will require a comprehensive, long-term effort from a wide range of 
stakeholders and regulators.6 FDA, through its authority over the drug market, 
undoubtedly has an important role to play in this landscape.7 
 
1 See, e.g., Eriko Onishi et al, Comparison of Opioid Prescribing Patterns in the United States and 
Japan: Primary Care Physicians’ Attitudes and Perceptions, 30 J. AM. BRD FAM. MED. 248, 249 (2017); 
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION: ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE REPORT OF DRUG-RELATED 
RISKS AND OUTCOMES (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/pubs/2017-cdc-drug-surveillance-
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2AL-SWYG] [hereinafter 2017 CDC Report]; see also Benedikt Fischer et 
al., Non-Medical use of Prescription Opioids and Prescription Opioid-Related Harms: Why So Markedly 
Higher in North American Compared to the Rest of the World?, 109 ADDICTION 177, 178 (2013) (“The 
United States consumes the vast majority of the world’s [prescription opioid] supply . . . .”). 
2 See, e.g., Gery P. Guy Jr. et al., Vital Signs: Changes in Opioid Prescribing in the United States, 
2006–2015, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION: MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (July 
7, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/66/wr/mm6626a4.htm; [https://perma.cc/MU2W-8VEQ]. 
3 See Dina Gusovsky, Americans Consume Vast Majority of the World’s Opioids, CNBC (Apr. 27, 
2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/04/27/americans-consume-almost-all-of-the-global-opioid-supply.html. 
[https://perma.cc/AM6C-ZKS2]. 
4 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Opioid Overdose, https://www.cdc.gov/drug
overdose/index.html; see also Leo Beletsky et al., Fatal Re-Entry: Legal and Programmatic Opportunities 
to Curb Opioid Overdose Among Individuals Newly Released from Incarceration, 7 NE. U.L.J. 149, 150 
(2015) (describing the “public health crisis” of opioid overdose); Ameet Sarpatwari et al., The Opioid 
Epidemic: Fixing A Broken Pharmaceutical Market, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 463, 464 (2017) (“It is 
difficult to overstate the extent of opioid overuse and misuse in the United States.”). 
5 In addition to prescription opioids, illicit opioids, such as heroin and synthetic fentanyl, clearly 
also play a central role in the current U.S. opioid epidemic. The markets for prescription and illicit opioids 
cannot be viewed in isolation, and in recent years illicit, not prescription, opioids have driven much of the 
increase in overdose deaths. See, e.g., 2017 CDC Report, supra note 1, at 8, 20–22; see also Wilson M. 
Compton et al., Relationship Between Non-medical Prescription Opioid Use and Heroin Use, 374 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 154, 160 (2016) (finding that a majority of heroin users report using prescription opioids 
before heroin initiation); Pradip K. Muhuri et al., Associations of Nonmedical Pain Reliever Use and 
Initiation of Heroin Use in the United States, CBHSQ DATA REVIEW (Aug. 2013), 
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/DR006/DR006/nonmedical-pain-reliever-use-2013.htm. 
[https://perma.cc/NZ9K-PSH2] (finding same). But the focus of this Article is on FDA’s role in helping to 
address the ways that prescription opioids contribute to the problem while also ensuring that prescription 
opioids remain available for appropriate, evidence-based pain management. 
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A key question relating to FDA’s role in the U.S. prescription opioid epidemic is 
to what extent FDA can consider, or regulate, the health care provider and patient 
behaviors that contribute to over-prescribing and misuse of these drugs. This is, in 
part, because the standard for approval in the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(FDCA) describes drug safety and effectiveness in terms of “the conditions 
prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling.”8 Accordingly, 
FDA’s evaluation of drugs is often understood as being what we call “drug-specific.” 
That is, the agency is viewed as solely focused on the benefits and risks of the 
products as defined in the preapproval clinical trials that are used to set the drug’s 
official FDA-approved indication, which are generally short-term studies in highly-
selected populations. Likewise, after approval, FDA’s regulatory decision making is 
traditionally conceived as being restricted to addressing the use of the drug as 
described in FDA-approved labeling, even though providers and patients prescribe or 
use drugs in ways that deviate from that labeling.9 
For prescription opioids, such a drug-specific focus clearly would exclude 
important information about the real-world use and public-health impact of this drug 
class. In addition, although opioids provide a particularly salient example of a drug 
class with the potential for externalities, they are not the only such class of 
prescription drugs. Other FDA-approved prescription drugs and drug classes have 
effects beyond the individual being treated, including those with the potential for 
 
OPIOID Use 1–17 (Jonathan K. Phillips, Morgan A. Ford & Richard J. Bonnie eds., 2017), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK458660/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK458660.pdf [hereinafter NAS 
REPORT]; see also Richard J. Bonnie et al., Both Urgency and Balance Needed in Addressing Opioid 
Epidemic: A Report from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 318 JAMA 
423, 423–24 (2017). 
7 See, e.g., Scott Gottlieb & Janet Woodcock, Marshaling FDA Benefit-Risk Expertise to Address 
the Current Opioid Abuse Epidemic, 318 JAMA 421, 421 (2017). 
8 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). There are other reasons that one might question FDA’s ability to regulate 
provider and patient behaviors. For example, FDA oversight has long been characterized as distinct from 
medical practice regulation. See, e.g., Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs; 
Prescribing for Uses Unapproved by the FDA, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503, 16,504 (proposed Aug. 15, 1972). 
Notwithstanding this conventional wisdom, the agency indirectly regulates or influences provider 
behavior in various ways, such as through requiring Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS). 
See, e.g., Lewis Grossman, Drugs, Biologics, and Devices: FDA Regulation, Intellectual Property, and 
Medical Products in the American Healthcare System, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW 
637 (I. Glenn Cohen, Allison Hoffman & William Sage eds., 2016) (describing FDA’s indirect regulation 
of medical practice); Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in Controlling the Practice of 
Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 149, 173 (2004) (“[T]he FDA undoubtedly affects the practice of medicine, 
even if only indirectly.”); Margaret Foster Riley, An Unfulfilled Promise: Changes Needed to the Drug 
Approval Process to Make Personalized Medicine A Reality, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 289, 308 (2015) (“In 
2007, FDAAA introduced potentially far-reaching limits on the practice of medicine doctrine allowing 
FDA to impose restrictions (e.g. place and mode of use) on approved drugs.”); Patricia J. Zettler, Toward 
Coherent Federal Oversight of Medicine, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 427, 498 (describing FDA’s REMS 
authority as indirectly regulating medical practice); see also Barbara J. Evans, Distinguishing Product and 
Practice Regulation in Personalized Medicine, 81 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 288, 288 
(2007) (describing “the crucial distinction between product and practice regulation”); Scott Gottlieb, Drug 
Safety Proposals and the Intrusion of Federal Regulation into Patient Freedom and Medical Practice, 26 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 664, 672 (2007) (describing RiskMAPs as “put[ting] the FDA squarely in the role of 
dictating medical practice standards and promoting specific clinical behavior”). 
9 See, e.g., Tewodros Eguale et al., Drug, Patient, and Physician Characteristics Associated with 
Off-Label Prescribing in Primary Care, 172 ARCHIVE INTERNAL MED. 781, 781 (2012) (describing the 
prevalence of off-label prescribing); Aaron S. Kesselheim, Off-Label Drug Use and Promotion: Balancing 
Public Health Goals and Commercial Speech, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 225, 234 (2011) (describing same). 
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misuse, such as benzodiazepines approved to treat anxiety, and those without the 
potential for misuse, such as antibiotics, which, when used inappropriately, 
accelerate the development of resistant bacteria.10 
Thus, to better regulate prescription opioids and other drugs with externalities, one 
step FDA should take is to use a broad perspective in its approval (and withdrawal) 
decisions, by incorporating information in addition to that used in a conventional, 
drug-specific approach. We call this a “public health” basis for decision-making. In 
fact, a close review of FDA regulatory history reveals that for some decisions about 
specific drugs and drug classes, including certain opioids, FDA already does this by 
incorporating information outside the approved labeling—such as population health 
impacts and how providers and patients actually use drugs—in its decisions.11 In this 
Article, we review how the FDCA authorizes FDA to take such a public health 
approach not only in its efforts to influence provider and patient behavior through 
labeling, risk evaluation and mitigation strategies, and other tools, but also in its 
approval and withdrawal decisions. FDA would effectively serve its mission by 
consistently using its authority to incorporate public health considerations into 
approval and withdrawal decisions for drugs with a high potential for externalities. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explains the challenges of regulating 
drugs with externalities, using prescription opioids as a paradigmatic example that 
demonstrates the need for the agency to incorporate public health considerations in 
its oversight of drugs. Part II describes FDA’s legal authority to take this broad 
approach in its drug approval and withdrawal decisions. Finally, Part III offers some 
principles for implementing this approach systematically to meet public health goals. 
I. PRESCRIPTION OPIOIDS AND THE CHALLENGE OF 
REGULATING DRUGS WITH EXTERNALITIES 
For many drugs, safety and effectiveness can be well-understood through FDA’s 
traditional, drug-specific regulatory process that focuses on the benefits and risks of 
the drug as shown in preapproval clinical trials, and then used as described in FDA-
approved labeling after marketing. Prescription opioids, however, are an example of 
when this regulatory model cannot provide a comprehensive picture of the drugs’ 
impact on patients and the public health. This Part first provides background on the 
role of prescription opioids in the current opioid epidemic, including how provider 
and patient behaviors influence the drugs’ risks. Then it describes how FDA has 
addressed this public health problem through its conventional, drug-specific 
regulatory approach, in the context of its shared jurisdiction with the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA). 
 
10 See, e.g., Xanax (alprazolam) Labeling, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/
2016/018276s052lbl.pdf; [https://perma.cc/M9GA-C6D5]; FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Battle of the Bugs: 
Fighting Antibiotic Resistance, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143568.htm. 
[https://perma.cc/K6ZN-L4U8]. For additional examples of other drugs and drug classes that, like opioids, 
may have externalities, see infra notes 170–174 and accompanying text. 
11 See Section II.A., infra. 
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A. The Current Opioid Crisis 
Prescription opioids are clearly associated with numerous risks for users that have 
given rise to the current opioid crisis.12 These include some risks that might be easily 
understood to be medical, or public health, concerns, such as death resulting from 
overdose, developing a substance use disorder, or impaired cognitive function, as 
well as less severe, but still debilitating, symptoms like constipation.13 The risks 
associated with prescription opioid use also include harms that may not as easily be 
understood to be matters of public health, but arguably ought to be. These include 
outcomes such as users transitioning from prescription to illicit opioids like heroin, 
or negative effects on users’ families’ well-being.14 
How opioids are prescribed and used influence these risks associated with the 
products.15 For example, the formulation (e.g., extended- or immediate-release), 
dosage, and number of days’ supply all have an effect on the risk of developing a 
substance use disorder or of overdosing.16 Similarly, the route of administration—
which a patient or user might have control over, for example by crushing a pill to 
snort or inject it—affects the risks associated with opioids.17 
Although many of the risks of opioids are now well-known, opioids also have 
been some of the most effective analgesics available, and pain is a widespread, 
complex, and serious public health problem.18 Perhaps unsurprisingly given the 
potential benefits of prescription opioids for pain management and the way behaviors 
influence the drugs’ risks, the current opioid crisis developed alongside increased 
prescribing of opioids and recognition of the under-treatment of pain, as well as 
industry marketing of prescription opioids. 
1. The Profound Difficulties of Treating Pain 
Pain is the perception manifest from nociceptive stimuli in internal tissues and 
external insults detected by peripheral sensors in the body.19 It is a complex 
physiologic process, involving many different forms of pain encoded by a number of 
neural circuits.20 Pain may be expressed in numerous forms, for example, stabbing, 
pricking, burning or aching, and may also produce diverse emotions and sensations.21 
Pain also arises in multiple clinical contexts, and each context, and sometimes each 
individual patient, raises specific issues that need to be addressed in distinct ways. 
For example, the pain requiring treatment may be acute, as a result of surgery or an 
injury, such as might occur from playing a sport. Likewise, dental procedures may 
 
12 For a full examination of the risks of opioids, see, e.g., the NAS REPORT, supra note 6. 
13 NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 120 (citing Howard L. Fields, Should We Be Reluctant to 
Prescribe Opioids for Chronic Non-malignant Pain?, 129 PAIN 233 (2007)). 
14 See id. at 388, 393. 
15 See, e.g., id. at 196. 
16 See, e.g., id. at 191–93. 
17 See, e.g., id. 
18 See id. at 120. 
19 Cedric Piers & Rebecca Seal, Neural Circuits for Pain: Recent Advances and Current Views, 354 
SCIENCE 578 (2016). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
226 FOOD AND DRUG LAW JOURNAL VOL. 73 
cause acute pain. Pain may also be chronic, for example, from arthritis, fibromyalgia, 
and back pain. Pain also may be associated with cancer treatment and end-of-life 
care. Each individual setting, and patient within that setting, may present special 
characteristics that may make the pain treatments more or less likely to pose risks of 
misuse. 
In the 1990s, the challenges of pain management, and more specifically, the 
under-assessment and under-treatment of pain, became a leading medical concern.22 
There was ample evidence of this problem; once asked, many patients reported pain 
that was not only untreated, but largely unnoticed.23 Pain control advocates noted 
that patients were often left with long-term intractable pain. At the time, advocates 
also believed that physicians’ reluctance to prescribe opioids because of concerns 
about the potential for addiction was misplaced. Among other things, they pointed to 
a now-widely-cited one-paragraph letter to the editor in a leading medical journal 
that reported that a review of medical records suggested that addiction was rare when 
opioids were used in hospitalized patients without a history of addiction.24 Another 
article published in 1986 argued that opioids could safely be used for non-cancer-
related pain.25 Despite the relatively small sample size of that study, its premise was 
largely undisputed and follow up research was not conducted. 
Such studies and efforts ultimately led to changes in the medical profession. In 
1996, in what is now a well-known address, the president of the American Pain 
Society argued that pain should be deemed the fifth vital sign. The society 
subsequently developed algorithms for assessing pain to be included as part of vital 
sign assessments. By 1999, the Joint Commission issued standards requiring health 
care organizations to improve pain management and required vigorous treatment of 
pain.26 In 2004, the Federation of State Medical Boards recommended that state 
boards consider punishment for under-treatment of pain. Physician thought-leaders 
regularly lectured that only 1 percent of the population was at risk for addiction.27 
Yet despite this attention, all pain, and especially chronic pain, has remained 
notoriously difficult to treat. Finding appropriate therapies for pain requires 
understanding the various complex neural circuits involved in different types of pain, 
much of which is now better—but still incompletely—understood.28 Nearly half of 
all dispensed opioid prescriptions in 2012 were prescribed by primary care 
 
22 David W. Baker, The Joint Commission’s Pain Standards: Origins and Evolution (May 5, 2017), 
https://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/6/Pain_Std_History_Web_Version_05122017.pdf. [https://
perma.cc/F8Z4-37B2]. 
23 Sarpatwari et al., supra note 4, at 465 (citing Marilee Donovan et al., Incidence and 
Characteristics of Pain in a Sample of Medical–Surgical Inpatients, 30 PAIN 69, 71, 73 (1987)). 
24 Jane Porter & Hershel Jick, Addiction Rare in Patients Treated with Narcotics, 302 NEJM 123 
(1980); see also Pamela TM Leung et al., A 1980 Letter on the Risk of Opioid Addiction, 376 NEJM 2194 
(2017). 
25 R.K. Portenoy & K.M. Foley, Chronic Use of Opioid Analgesics in Non-malignant Pain: Report 
of 38 Cases, 25 PAIN 171 (1986). 
26 Baker, supra note 22, at 3–4. 
27 Thomas Catan & Evan Perez, A Pain-Drug Champion Has Second Thoughts, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 
17, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324478304578173342657044604?mg=
prod/accounts-wsj. 
28 Id.; Hance Clarke et al., The Prevention of Chronic Postsurgical Pain using Gabapentin and 
Pregabalin: A Combined Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 115 PAIN MEDICINE 428 (2012). 
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physicians, most of whom have only basic education in the details of pain 
management.29 There are also insufficient numbers of pain specialists, meaning that 
other physicians may be unable to connect with a specialist in providing care. 
2. Pharmaceutical Industry Marketing 
Not only is pain difficult to understand and treat, it is widespread. Millions of 
Americans suffer from the burden of pain.30 Pain poses a significant social and 
economic burden in the U.S., costing an estimated $635 billion in treatment and 
management of pain alone,31 not including the substantial economic costs from 
diminished work productivity for both pain sufferers and their families and other 
caregivers. This has led to an enormous market for pain management therapies, 
estimated at $36.1 billion in 2017 with the expectation that it could grow to $52.0 
billion by 2022,32 which has been long recognized by the pharmaceutical industry. 
The pharmaceutical industry spends tens of billions of dollars per year on 
marketing in an effort to influence prescriber and patient behaviors, and marketing 
methods have become increasingly sophisticated over the years.33 Such methods 
include setting up face to face meetings between health care providers and 
pharmaceutical sales representatives (detailing); providing health care providers with 
samples34; paying “thought leaders” for presentations at educational and professional 
meetings; funding Continuing Medical Education programs. All of these strategies 
have been demonstrated highly effective at increasing prescribing of the advertised 
drug. Approximately $4 billion per year is spent on direct-to-consumer (DTC) 
advertising, which has been shown to lead exposed patients to ask for the advertised 
drug by name, which in turn makes physicians more likely to prescribe it.35 In recent 
 
29 NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 57. 
30 The 2011 Institute of Medicine (IOM) Report, Relieving Pain in America, estimated that as many 
as 100 million Americans suffer from chronic pain. See INST. OF MEDICINE, RELIEVING PAIN IN AMERICA: 
A BLUEPRINT FOR TRANSFORMING PREVENTION, CARE, EDUCATION, AND RESEARCH (2011) [hereinafter 
2011 IOM REPORT]. While that estimate is probably too high, see NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 50, 
chronic pain is unquestionably one of the most common and intractable medical problems facing 
Americans today. 
31 2011 IOM REPORT, supra note 30; Wayne Winegarden, Estimating the Net Economic Benefit of 
Abuse-Deterrent Opioids, ECONO STATS (March 2015), http://econostats.org/estimating-the-net-
economicbenefit-of-abuse-deterrent-opioids. 
32 BCC RESEARCH, THE GLOBAL MARKET FOR PAIN MANAGEMENT DRUGS AND DEVICES (Aug. 
2017), https://www.bccresearch.com/market-research/healthcare/the-global-market-for-pain-management-
drugs-and-devices-hlc026f.html. 
33 Persuading the Prescribers: Pharmaceutical Industry Marketing and its Influence on Physicians 
and Patients, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/fact-sheets/2013/11/11/persuading-the-prescribers-pharmaceutical-industry-marketing-and-its-
influence-on-physicians-and-patients. 
34 Id. at 2. 
35 Ed Silverman, All That Pharmaceutical Advertising May be a ‘Mixed Bag,’ After All, STAT 
(Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/09/13/direct-to-consumer-drug-ads/. This is 
not to say that DTC advertising’s public health effects are all negative. For example, DTC advertising can 
be used to promote awareness of new drugs and their risks. See, e.g., Elizabeth Almasi et. al, What are the 
Public Health Effects of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising? 3 PLOS MEDICINE e145 (2006). FDA is 
currently studying the effect of such advertising on the public, although it is not studying that effect 
specifically in the context of opioids. See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Office of Prescription Drug 
Promotion (OPDP) Research, https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProducts
andTobacco/CDER/ucm090276.htm#research. 
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years, large pharmaceutical manufacturers have reduced early-pipeline internal 
research and development in favor of purchasing intellectual property from small 
biotech companies after they have established proof of concept and completed some 
clinical trials. The large companies then handle the later-phase trials required for 
approvals, and focus resources on sales and marketing. 
Against this backdrop of an increased focus on marketing rather than research and 
development, opioids can be an especially attractive product because most opioids 
now entering the market involve tweaks on the existing technology and do not 
require extensive R&D, while offering a large potential market of patients.36 Indeed, 
as professional organizations encouraged physicians to focus on pain assessment and 
management beginning in the 1990s, opioid manufacturers actively helped 
physicians meet these new standards. Until public health experts recently began 
sounding the alarm about increasing addiction and FDA began holding stakeholder 
meetings to discuss opioid misuse, manufacturers engaged in aggressive marketing 
of opioids. Purdue Pharma (Purdue) probably provides the most notorious example, 
although it was by no means alone. When Purdue introduced its extended-release 
oxycodone product (OxyContin) in 1995, it was the first formulation of oxycodone 
with an approved dosing schedule of every 12 hours rather than every 4 to 6 hours. It 
was indicated “for the management of moderate to severe pain where use of an 
opioid analgesic is appropriate for more than a few days.”37 Sales of OxyContin grew 
from $44 million (316,000 prescriptions) in 1996 to over $1 billion in 2000, with 
combined sales of almost $3 billion in 2001-2002 (14 million prescriptions).38 This 
was the result of a systematic and comprehensive marketing scheme.39 In that period, 
Purdue held more than 40 all-expense paid conferences for more than 5000 
physicians, pharmacists, and nurses. Purdue doubled its sales force, gave significant 
bonuses to sales representatives, and actively engaged the highest prescribers. In 
addition, Purdue greatly expanded its market by promoting Oxycontin for non-cancer 
related pain. Oxycontin prescriptions for non-cancer-related pain expanded from 
670,000 in 1997 to 6.2 million in 2002.40 Throughout that time, Purdue’s 
promotional materials argued that the risk of addiction was tiny.41 Purdue, and three 
of its executives, ultimately pleaded guilty to criminal charges related to the 
misleading promotion of OxyContin in 2007. 
Although FDA monitors and regulates prescription drug advertising, examples of 
troubling marketing of opioids and related products have continued to arise. For 
example, in 2016 the Department of Justice (DOJ) charged two former 
 
36 Most research and development in the opioid market is focused abuse deterrent formulations 
(ADF). See Report: Opioid Pain Sales to $18.4B in the U.S. by 2020, CENTERWATCH (July 17, 2017), 
https://www.centerwatch.com/news-online/2017/07/17/report-opioid-pain-sales-hit-18-4b-u-s-2020 
[https://perma.cc/3UGK-4866]. 
37 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-110, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: OXYCONTIN ABUSE 
AND DIVERSION AND EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM 35 (2003). 
38 Art Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, Public Health 
Tragedy, 99 J. AM PUBLIC HEALTH 221, 223 (2009). 
39 Id. at 221. 
40 Id. at 223 
41 Id. OxyContin’s original label approved in 1996 stated that “Delayed absorption, as provided by 
OxyContin tables, is believed to reduce the abuse liability of the drug.” See, e.g., $635 Million Settlement 
Resolves Oxycontin Charges, 15 NO. 4 FDA ADVERT. & PROMOTION MANUAL NEWSLETTER 2. 
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pharmaceutical sales representatives with fraudulently using educational programs to 
promote sales of fentanyl sublingual spray (Subsys). The complaint alleged that 
physicians were compensated for providing educational presentations to healthcare 
professionals, but that the programs were pretense for social gatherings at expensive 
restaurants.42 As another example, one of the most notorious advertisements aired 
during the 2017 Super Bowl was an advertisement was for naloxegol (Movantik), a 
drug indicated for opioid-induced constipation. Although the drug was not an opioid, 
critics noted that the advertisement sought to normalize use of opioids for chronic 
pain.43 
Marketing practices have also harnessed the power of patient advocacy groups. As 
these groups have proliferated in recent years, drug manufacturers can influence 
them by providing grant funding, which may garner endorsements for the 
manufacturers’ positions.44 Reuters reported that opioid manufacturers gave money 
to 45 of 158 patient advocacy and professional organizations that commented on the 
CDC’s 2015 proposed guidelines on prescribing opioids for chronic pain. 
Organizations that had received funding from opioid manufacturers were more likely 
to oppose the guidelines.45 
Pharmaceutical industry marketing and patient advocacy (some funded by the 
industry) were two leading factors that changed the culture around opioid prescribing 
and contributed to the explosion in use of opioids over the last few decades. These 
opioid use trends, in turn, revealed the substantial potential for misuse and overdose. 
In 2016, forty percent of all opioid related deaths in the U.S., roughly 16,000 people, 
were due to prescription opioids.46 An estimated two million people misuse or are 
dependent on prescription opioids.47 Many of the individuals who have moved on to 
stronger illicit drugs like heroin and fentanyl began by misusing prescription opioids. 
 
42 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former Pharmaceutical Company Employees Arrested for 
Participating in Fentanyl Kickback Scheme (June 9, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/former-
pharmaceutical-company-employees-arrested-participating-fentanyl-kickback-scheme [https://perma.cc/
4CP9-HW4W]. 
43 Ahiza Garcia, Super Bowl Drug Ad Spurs Big Backlash, CNN (Feb. 12, 2016), 
http://money.cnn.com/2016/02/11/news/super-bowl-painkiller-constipation-ad/index.html [https://perma.
cc/4Z2U-4D7T]. 
44 C. Wick et al., The Characteristics of Unsolicited Clinical Oncology Literature Provided by 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 18 ANNALS OF ONCOLOGY 1580 (2007). 
45 Ronnie Cohen, Industry Money May Taint Advice from Patient Groups, Regulators, REUTERS 
(Jan. 17, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-patients-advocacy-conflicts/industry-money-
may-taint-advice-from-patient-groups-regulators-idUSKBN1512ZG. [https://perma.cc/4BNA-FXNY]. 
Reuters also reported that United Therapeutics Corp. is paying $210 million to settle claims that it used a 
patient-assistance charity to illegally pay Medicare patients’ expenses for its blood pressure medications, 
thereby increasing its sales. This settlement is the first to come out of a broader investigation by the 
government into the financial relationships between various pharmaceutical manufacturers and patient 
groups. See Nate Raymond, United Therapeutics to Pay $210 Million to Resolve U.S. Kickback Probe, 
REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-utd-therapeut-settlement/united-
therapeutics-to-pay-210-million-to-resolve-u-s-kickback-probe-idUSKBN1EE24U 
[https://perma.cc/NJY7-EG5K]. 
46 CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Prescription Opioid Overdose Data (2017), 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/overdose.html [https://perma.cc/JVP7-E543]. 
47 DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 
ADMIN., CTR FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH STATISTICS AND QUALITY, NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE 
AND HEALTH (2014), https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH-FRR1-2014/NSDUH-
FRR1-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6GN-PPZL]. 
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The social cost of opioid misuse and dependence is nearly eighty billion dollars 
annually.48 In short, the patient advocates who argued for better treatment of pain in 
the 1980s and 1990s were not wrong about the need to do so, but the fact that such 
advocacy led to the prescribing of more opioids became its own problem.49 
B. Applying FDA’s Regulatory Process to Opioids 
FDA oversight of prescription drugs covers the human clinical trials necessary to 
support approval and continues through the approval decision and the monitoring of 
drugs after they are marketed. Despite this regulation, one reason there has been little 
evidence of the comprehensive safety and effectiveness of opioids, particularly in the 
context of indirect effects, addiction, and third-party misuse, is that, as explained in 
this section, FDA’s traditional, drug-specific regulatory scheme generally has not 
required such study.50 
1. The Approval Process 
The approval process for opioids has generally been the same as that for other new 
drugs.51 FDA’s approval process focuses on a particular drug’s safety and efficacy as 
demonstrated in the setting of its clinical trials. In most situations, it does not factor 
in the practice of medicine or patient behavior. To initiate clinical investigation of a 
new compound, a drug sponsor must file an Investigational New Drug Application 
(IND) in which the sponsor lays out its general investigative plan, its projected 
clinical protocols as well as information about the drug’s chemistry, pharmacology, 
and toxicology.52 The investigative plan lays out the anticipated types of clinical 
trials that will be conducted, the number and characteristics of the participants in the 
clinical trials and any foreseeable risks to participants based on the drug’s 
toxicology. 
For approval, the FDCA requires that drugs be shown to have benefits that 
outweigh their risks.53 A drug’s efficacy is demonstrated by showing “substantial 
evidence” of its effects under the conditions of use prescribed. Clinical benefit is 
subject to the intended use of the drug; it may mean an improvement in symptoms, 
 
48 Sarpatwari et al., supra note 4, at 464 (citing Curtis s. Florence et al., The Economic Burden of 
Prescription Opioid Overdose, Abuse and Dependence in the United States, 2013, 54 MED. CARE 901, 
901 (2016)). 
49 NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 51. 
50 Cf. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. 
TECH. L. REV. 345, 347–48 (2007) (describing how FDA approval incentivizes research). 
51 Because some opioids have been on the market since before the Kefauver-Harris Amendments of 
1962, and the FDCA itself, were enacted, certain drugs were subject to the Drug Efficacy Study 
Implementation (DESI) review rather than the modern drug approval process. However, like the modern 
drug approval process, the DESI review was focused on effectiveness for individual patients in the context 
of the drug’s labeling, not on indirect effects. Much of the DESI review of opioids was not completed 
until the 1980s. See, e.g., NAS Report, supra note 6, at 359–60; Peter Barton Hutt & Robert Temple, 
Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Drug Amendments of 1962, 68 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 449, 454 
(2013); FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Background Document, Pediatric Advisory Committee Meeting, 
Benefit/Risk Assessment of Prescription Opioid Antitussive Products for Treatment of Cough in Pediatric 
Patients (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeeting
Materials/PediatricAdvisoryCommittee/UCM575013.pdf. 
52 21 C.F.R. § 312.23. 
53 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). 
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an improved mode of delivery or an improved side-effect profile as compared to no 
therapy (often a placebo) or a known effective therapy. Safety is measured within the 
studied cohort. Superiority is not required. FDA prefers two “adequate and well-
controlled investigations” of a drug’s efficacy, but the FDCA was changed in 1997 
to permit FDA to grant approval on the basis of only one such investigation with 
additional supporting evidence.54 About one-third of drugs are now approved on the 
basis of a single pivotal trial.55 
Because clinical trials often represent the greatest expense in the drug approval 
process for drug sponsors, sponsors are incentivized to eliminate as much human 
variability as possible in the clinical trial process. This means that there can be major 
differences between the study population and the population that ultimately uses the 
drug after it is approved. For example, in the case of the extended-release 
hydrocodone (Zohydro) approved in 2013, the clinical trial that supported the drug’s 
approval was limited to patients with lower back pain. No trials involving other 
patients who might use the drug for pain, such as patients with cancer or arthritis 
were required.56 In addition, to further reduce the potential for human variability, 
opioid drug sponsors have used a controversial trial design called “enriched 
enrollment randomized withdrawal” (EERW). That method screens out patients who 
are non-responsive or suffer adverse effects so that they do not confound efficacy 
data. Critics, however, argue that the methodology further reinforces the disconnect 
between the clinical trials supporting regulatory approval and clinical practice in the 
real world.57 
In addition, most opioids approved in recent decades have not been subject to the 
full clinical trial process required for novel drugs because they are reformulations of 
existing drugs. They have therefore been approved via an abbreviated pathway that 
relies heavily on the safety and efficacy data about the existing product.58 Clinical 
trials are required to bridge any differences between the products or to address any 
new safety signals that may arise.59 But those clinical trials are typically of a short 
duration that does not reflect how long opioids are frequently prescribed in clinical 
practice. 
2. Post-Approval Monitoring 
FDA continues to monitor and evaluate the safety and effectiveness of new drugs 
once they are approved and marketed. This is because some risks may not be 
apparent until after larger and more heterogenous populations have used the drug. 
Likewise, some risks may become apparent when a drug has been used for a duration 
 
54 Id.; see also The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA), Pub. L. 
No. 105-115 § 115, 11 Stat. 2296, 2313. 
55 Nicholas S. Downing et al., Clinical Trial Evidence Supporting FDA Approval of Novel 
Therapeutic Agents, 2005–2012, 311 JAMA 368 (2014). 
56 NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 364; FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND 
RESEARCH, Summary Review [of Zohydro ER] (Oct. 25, 2013), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/
drugsatfda_docs/label/2013/202880Orig1s000SumR.pdf [https://perma.cc/NV69-AEXZ]. 
57 Jonah Campbell & Nicholas King, “Unsettling Circularity”: Clinical Trial Enrichment and the 
Evidentiary Politics of Chronic Pain, 12 BIOSOCIETIES 191 (2017). 
58 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2). 
59 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50, 314.54. 
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longer than that of the clinical trials supporting approval (two-thirds of drugs are 
approved based on trials lasting six months or shorter). 
One primary way that FDA monitors marketed drugs is through adverse event 
reporting. FDA maintains a database, FDA’s Adverse Event Reporting System 
(FAERS), that contains submitted adverse event reports relating to FDA regulated 
drugs and biologics.60 Drug manufacturers are subject to various reporting 
obligations, including providing FDA with serious and unexpected adverse event 
reports within fifteen days.61 But reports that come to FAERS from health care 
providers, lawyers, and patients, rather than manufacturers, are made voluntarily. 
Best estimates are that only 10 percent of adverse events are actually reported to 
FAERS.62 
To address some of these weaknesses of FAERS, in 2007 Congress authorized 
FDA to create an active postmarket surveillance system, known as Sentinel. FDA 
launched Sentinel to better monitor postmarket safety issues with drugs in 2014. 
Sentinel gathers and analyzes data provided by participating organizations, including 
some of the nation’s largest health insurers, disease registries as well as many 
hospitals. Although Sentinel should help FDA address some of the shortcomings of 
relying only on the information in FAERS, its ability to use its available data to 
accurately assess a drug’s risk is still subject to major challenges.63 
Beyond these general challenges of monitoring the safety and effectiveness of 
marketed drugs, adverse events relating to misuse of opioids are particularly 
challenging to observe because physicians or patients may have incentives to conceal 
them.64 For example, patients may not report some psychological effects relating to 
opioids. Because of stigma or fear of criminal prosecution, there may be reluctance 
to report issues relating to substance misuse. In addition, in many contexts of misuse, 
it is difficult to know which drug caused the adverse event. There are many different 
surveillance networks for drug misuse at the national and state level.65 The 
Researched Abuse, Diversion and Addiction-Related Surveillance System 
(RADARS) and the National Addictions Vigilance Intervention and Prevention 
Program (NAVIPPRO) are two that provide postmarketing surveillance data to the 
pharmaceutical industry. But those systems do not provide the product-level 
information that had been provided by the Drug Abuse Warning Network 
(DAWN).66 That data allowed comparison of the impacts, mortality and morbidity 
 
60 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Questions and Answers on FDA’s Adverse Event Reporting System 
(FAERS), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/surveillance/adversedrug
effects [https://perma.cc/2CM5-ZQJ7]. 
61 21 C.F.R. § 314.80; Steven Findlay, Health Policy Brief: The FDA’s Sentinel Initiative, HEALTH 
AFFAIRS (June 4, 2015), http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=139. 
[https://perma.cc/8SPG-XRKE]. Other reporting requirements include that manufacturers must report non-
serious or expected adverse events on a quarterly basis for the first three years after a drug is approved, 
and then annually thereafter. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.90. 
62 Findlay, supra note 61, at 2. 
63 Id. at 4. 
64 Richard C. Dart, Monitoring Risk: Post marketing Surveillance and Signal Detection, 105S DRUG 
AND ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE S26 (2009). 
65 See NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at app. C. 
66 NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 228. 
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trends, of specific products. Such data would likely be useful for FDA in developing 
postmarket risk mitigation strategies. The DAWN networks were defunded in 2011. 
FDA has the authority to require postmarketing studies if there is some evidence 
or signal of “serious risk.”67 The FDCA directs FDA to conduct regular screenings of 
the FAERS database to identify such risks, and through this process, FDA has 
identified drugs that may warrant further regulatory action or investigation. Although 
FDA has rarely used its authority to require additional studies based on such 
information, opioids are one such instance in which the agency has required 
postapproval research.68 However, FDA has limited authority to ensure that 
postmarket study commitments, in general, are completed.69 In the specific context 
of opioids, FDA may be further hampered by a lack of product-specific information. 
In addition to requiring studies and trials, FDA has the authority to require special 
risk mitigation programs, known as Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies 
(REMS). The agency has required REMS for almost all opioids, and has recently 
expanded the demands of those requirements. But even these broader REMS 
requirements do not address the need for further systematic study and research to 
fully understand the relationships between specific opioids’ uses and misuses.70 A 
recent meta-analysis of available studies on long-term opioid treatment found very 
few studies that extended for more than six weeks, and that methodologies and 
definitions varied widely.71 The study found limited evidence on the effectiveness of 
varying opioid dosing strategies, and limited date on the effectiveness of risk 
assessment modalities for predicting potential abuse or misuse. The authors 
expressed an urgent need for well-designed studies to answer some of these 
questions.72 Whether through pre-approval studies, postapproval surveillance, or 
other safety-related tools like REMS, FDA has not yet systematically used its 
authorities to require and assess comprehensive data on the indirect, public health 
impacts of opioids. 
 
67 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3). 
68 See, e.g., Letter from Bob A. Rappaport, Director, Division of Anesthesia and Analgesia 
Products, CDER, FDA, to Craig Landau, CMO & VP Clinical, Medical & Regulatory Affairs, Purdue 
Pharma L.P. (Apr. 5, 2010) (describing postmarket requirements for Oxycontin), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2010/022272s000ltr.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RKE8-5W7H]. For a database of all required postmarket studies, see FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., Postmarket Requirements and Commitments, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/
pmc/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/S579-UNL5]. 
69 Findlay, supra note 61, at 3; Kevin Fain et al., The Food and Drug Administration Amendments 
Act and Postmarketing Commitments, 310 JAMA 202, 202–03 (2013); see also Alison M. Pease et al., 
Postapproval Studies of Drugs Initially Approved by the FDA on the Basis of Limited Evidence: 
Systematic Review, 357 BRITISH MED. J. 1680 (2017). 
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immediate release opioids, still the most commonly prescribed class of opioids, in September 2017. See 
Scott Gottlieb, FDA Takes Important Steps to Stem the Tide of Opioid Misuse and Abuse, FDA VOICE 
(Sept. 28, 2017), https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2017/09/fda-takes-important-steps-to-stem-the-
tide-of-opioid-misuse-and-abuse. 
71 Roger Chou et al., The Effectiveness and Risks of Long-Term Opioid Therapy for Chronic Pain: 
A Systematic Review for a National Institutes of Health Pathways to Prevention Workshop, 162 ANNALS 
OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 276, 280–81 (2015). 
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C. The Role of DEA 
Because opioids are controlled substances,73 FDA is not the only federal regulator 
that oversees the opioid market, which further complicates the regulatory landscape. 
Since 1973, FDA has shared jurisdiction over the regulation of opioids and other 
controlled substances with DEA. DEA was created to add intensified law 
enforcement mechanisms to the federal response to drug misuse pursuant to the 
Controlled Substances Act (CSA).74 The CSA establishes a statutory framework for 
the regulation of production, possession, and distribution of controlled substances, 
defined as any drug or substance (excluding alcohol products) that has potential for 
abuse. Opioids have been treated as controlled substances and subject to some sort of 
scheduling since the advent of federal regulation in the 1920s. DEA licenses 
controlled substance manufacturers, sets supply quotas for the drugs, regulates 
prescribers and dispensing pharmacies, and prosecutes illicit or illegal use or 
production. 
Under the CSA, FDA and DEA share responsibility for determining scheduling of 
controlled substances. Scheduling is intended to balance the need to limit supply of 
potentially addicting drugs while at the same time permitting sufficient supply for 
medicinal and research use.75 The five schedules for drugs covered by the CSA are 
designed to provide a structure that would be responsive to the nuanced requirements 
of perceived danger, medical utility, and potential for abuse.76 Scheduling status 
affects prescribing power (e.g. manner of prescribing and limits on refills), triggers 
requirements for supply chain record keeping, and determines the degree of criminal 
punishment for illicit trafficking. While all five schedules impose controls, the most 
significant controls are imposed on Schedule I substances (extremely limited use) 
and Schedule II substances. Indeed, in practice, scheduling can have a profound 
effect on the therapeutic use of a drug, but it functions as a very blunt instrument. 
Many physicians refuse to prescribe schedule II drugs. Since many opioids are 
scheduled or being rescheduled into schedule II, this should reduce opioid 
prescribing but it may also limit access for patients who need them.77 
To make decisions about whether to schedule a drug and, if so, at what level, the 
CSA requires FDA and DEA to consider eight factors: (1) the drug’s actual or 
potential for abuse, (2) scientific evidence of the drug’s pharmacologic effect, (3) the 
state of current scientific knowledge regarding the drug, (4) the drug’s history and 
current pattern of abuse, (5) the scope, duration and significance of abuse, (6) risk to 
public health, (7) the drug’s psychic or physiologic dependence liability and (8) 
whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance already controlled 
 
73 See, e.g., DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, List of Controlled Substances, 
https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/schedules [https://perma.cc/63VD-242V]. 
74 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904. 
75 See, e.g., John A. Gilbert, Jr., DEA Regulation of Controlled Substances and Listed Chemicals, 
65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 623, 624 (2010). For a detailed discussion of how FDA and DEA work together on 
scheduling decisions, including difficulties that may arise in the process, see, e.g., Lars Noah, Challenges 
in the Federal Regulation of Pain Management Technologies, 31 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 55 (2003). 
76 Joseph F. Spillane, Debating the Controlled Substances Act, 76 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 
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77 See Noah, Challenges in the Federal Regulation of Pain Management Technologies, supra note 
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under the CSA.78 Some of this data, such as the scientific evidence of the drug’s 
pharmacologic effect, is readily accessible through FDA’s approval process. But 
much of the data cannot be available until there is broad experience with the drug. 
Moreover, given the paucity of research about long-term use of many opioids, many 
scheduling decisions are made in a way that appears data-driven but are in reality 
based on limited data and anecdotal evidence or intuition. 
Although DEA has an important role to play in responding to the opioid 
epidemic,79 the focus of DEA’s mission is one of law enforcement, rather than public 
health. Because of the complicated nature of the opioid crisis, including its 
intersection with pain management and prescriber and patient behaviors, it is critical 
that the regulatory response to the crisis include public health expertise.80 FDA, in 
contrast to DEA, has a public health mission, the institutional expertise in assessing a 
drug’s safety and effectiveness within the context of that mission, and the 
gatekeeping authority over prescription opioids. Accordingly, this Article focuses on 
FDA’s application of its legal authority to opioids, with subsequent consideration of 
other drugs that raise similar population health concerns. 
II. FDA’S LEGAL AUTHORITY TO TAKE A BROAD 
REGULATORY PERSPECTIVE 
The current opioid epidemic has arisen over the course of many years, and as a 
result of many complex factors.81 Adequately addressing the problem will take a 
sustained effort on the part of many regulators and stakeholders, and no one action 
by FDA, alone, will be sufficient.82 But there may be ways to improve FDA’s 
regulatory approach for opioids and other drugs with externalities—such as by 
ensuring that the agency incorporates population health information, including 
provider and patient behaviors, into its approval and withdrawal decisions in a 
systematic way. 
For many of its drug-related regulatory decisions, FDA’s authority to take this 
broader, public health perspective on the evidence relevant to those decisions is 
expressly granted in the FDCA. For example, FDA may require a REMS when 
necessary to ensure that a drug’s benefits outweigh its risks.83 In conducting that 
benefit-risk analysis, the statute explicitly contemplates the agency considering uses 
and impacts beyond those described in the labeling. In requiring a REMS, FDA is to 
consider, among other things, “any known or potential adverse events,” including the 
risks of misuse and overdose from patients using the drug in ways not in the labeled 
instructions.84 Additionally, for REMS with elements to assure safe use—the most 
 
78 21 U.S.C. § 811(c). 
79 See, e.g., Rebecca L. Haffajee, Preventing Opioid Misuse with Prescription Drug Monitoring 
Programs: A Framework for Evaluating the Success of State Public Health Laws, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1621, 
1637 (2016) (describing law enforcement’s ability to limit diversion as important for public health). 
80 See, e.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 1–15. 
81 See Part I, supra. 
82 See, e.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 1–15. 
83 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(1). 
84 See 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(1)(E), (b) (emphasis added); see also NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 
381 (making a similar point). 
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restrictive types of REMS—the agency must not only evaluate the benefits and risks 
of the drug, but also the impact of the REMS requirements on patient access and the 
health care delivery system.85 
Yet, because the baseline drug approval language in the FDCA is not parallel in 
its express wording,86 FDA’s approval decisions have been interpreted as “drug-
specific”—needing to be focused on the benefits and risks and the use of the drug as 
described in the labeling. We argue that such a conception of FDA’s authority is too 
narrow, and that a broader, “public health” approach can be observed in past FDA 
decisions regarding approval or withdrawal. This Part first describes FDA’s practice 
of taking a public health approach in its drug approval and withdrawal decisions, 
providing examples of when FDA has done so, and then describes the legal authority 
permitting that approach. 
A. The Public Health Regulatory Perspective in Practice 
The FDCA authorizes FDA to approve a drug when the drug is shown to be 
efficacious and safe enough “under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or 
suggested in the proposed labeling.”87 As FDA recently explained in a memorandum, 
“[t]he separate weighing of benefit and risk for each intended use is critical” because 
evidence supporting safety and efficacy in one “setting” does not necessarily indicate 
that the same product is safe and efficacious in another setting.88 
But the fact that a drug’s benefit-risk profile may be different in different settings 
does not mean that FDA must ignore the realities of how particular drugs are used, or 
likely to be used, in ways that deviate from the approved labeling and affect other 
patients or the public health.89 Indeed, FDA has recognized that the kinds of 
evidence necessary to determine safety and efficacy vary across drugs. Since at least 
1985, the agency’s regulations regarding approvals of new drug applications (NDAs) 
and abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs, for generics) have explained: 
While the statutory standards apply to all drugs, the many kinds of drugs that are 
subject to the statutory standards and the wide range of uses for those drugs demand 
flexibility in applying the standards. Thus, FDA is required to exercise its scientific 
judgment to determine the kind and quantity of data and information an applicant is 
required to provide for a particular drug to meet the statutory standards.90 
Similarly, for opioids and other drugs with the potential for misuse, since at least 
1985, FDA regulations have required that NDAs include “studies or information 
 
85 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(2); see also NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 10-15 (making a similar point). 
86 If FDA determines that an approved drug no longer satisfies the standard for approval, the agency 
may withdraw its approval of the drug. 21 U.S.C. 355(e). Thus, FDA’s withdrawal actions can be viewed 
as involving the same questions about the expansiveness of the information that it may consider as its 
approval decisions do. 
87 21 U.S.C. § 355(d); see also Am. Pharm. Ass’n v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1054, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 
1976) (McGowan, J., concurring) (arguing, based on 21 U.S.C. § 355(d), that “methadone is safe for its 
intended use notwithstanding the possibility that it will be employed in unintended fashions”). 
88 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MEMORANDUM: PUBLIC HEALTH INTERESTS AND FIRST AMENDMENT 
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89 Cf. Eguale et al., supra note 9 (describing the prevalence of off-label uses). 
90 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(c); see also 50 Fed. Reg. 7452 (Feb. 22, 1985); NAS REPORT, supra note 6, 
at 380 (“[T]he agency also has acknowledged that it has ‘flexibility’ in applying the approval standard.”). 
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related to abuse of the drug,” in recognition of the risks to individual patients and 
their communities associated with such drugs.91 FDA has implemented this 
regulatory language by taking a broad perspective on the evidence relevant to its 
benefit-risk determinations for approvals and withdrawals (or analogous decisions) 
for drugs subject to misuse and drugs with other kinds of clinical externalities.92 
One example of FDA incorporating population health information into its 
assessments of drugs of misuse comes from OxyContin, which was originally 
approved for moderate to severe pain when continuous, around-the-clock treatment 
was needed.93 In 2010, after FDA approved an abuse-deterrent formulation of 
OxyContin, Purdue, the drug’s manufacturer, took the original formulation off the 
market.94 FDA was then faced with the possibility of generic manufacturers seeking 
approval for their formulations. Before a generic equivalent of a no-longer-marketed 
brand-name drug may be approved, FDA must determine whether the brand-name 
drug was withdrawn for reasons of safety or effectiveness, and this determination is, 
essentially, based on the same criteria that FDA uses to approve or withdraw 
approval of applications.95 In this case, FDA concluded that the brand-name was 
withdrawn from the market for reasons of safety or effectiveness, a determination 
that was made based on widespread patient misuse of that non-abuse-deterrent 
formulation. FDA’s finding “that the benefits of original OxyContin no longer 
outweigh its risks” provides an example of the agency incorporating non-labeling-
related patient experiences into its benefit-risk determination process.96 
As another example, in June 2017, FDA asked Endo Pharmaceuticals to stop 
marketing its extended-released oxymorphone product, Opana ER, “due to the public 
health consequences of abuse,” and explained that if Endo Pharmaceuticals declined 
to voluntarily withdraw Opana from the market, FDA would “take steps to formally 
 
91 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(vii), 50 Fed. Reg. 7452 (Feb. 22, 1985); see also NAS REPORT, supra 
note 6, at 381 (“For drugs with the potential for misuse, for example, NDAs must include ‘studies or 
information related to abuse of the drug,’ which, of course, is not information about the use of the drug as 
directed in the proposed labeling.”). 
92 See, e.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 380–85; Gottlieb and Woodcock, supra note 7; Peter 
Lurie, Associate Commissioner, FDA, Integrating the Broader Public Health Consequences of Opioid 
Abuse and Misuse into the Evaluation of New Opioid Products (Nov. 4, 2016), 
http://www.nationalacademies.org/hmd/~/media/Files/Activity%20Files/PublicHealth/PainResearch/LUR
IE2.pdf [https://perma.cc/T299-QM2L] [hereinafter Lurie Presentation]; see also 82 Fed. Reg. 45,597, 
45,599 (Sept. 29, 2017) (soliciting comment on what “public health considerations” should be 
incorporated into FDA’s benefit-risk assessment of opioids). 
93 78 Fed. Reg. 23,273 (Apr. 18, 2013) [hereinafter OxyContin Notice]. 
94 Id. 
95 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(7)(C); see also OxyContin Notice, supra note 93, at 23,274 (“FDA 
concludes that the benefits of original OxyContin no longer outweigh its risks.”). But see DONALD. O. 
BEERS & KURT R. KARST, GENERIC AND INNOVATOR DRUGS: A GUIDE TO FDA APPROVAL 
REQUIREMENTS § 3.02[B] (8th ed., 2017) (“How FDA is supposed to determine whether a drug has been 
withdrawn from sale for safety or effectiveness reasons is not spelled out in the statute.”). 
96 OxyContin Notice, supra note 93, at 23,274. FDA’s decision on OxyContin did not amount to a 
decision that all non-abuse deterrent formulations were no longer safe and effective. For example, shortly 
after the agency published its determination that original OxyContin was removed from the market for 
safety and effectiveness reasons, the agency determined that original Opana ER (oxymorphone), which 
also lacked an abuse deterrent formulation, was not removed from the market for safety and effectiveness 
reasons after the newer abuse deterrent formulation was approved. The agency distinguished reformulated 
Opana ER from reformulated OxyContin based on data suggesting that reformulated Opana, unlike 
OxyContin, could still be easily crushed and snorted. See 78 Fed. Reg. 38,053 (June 25, 2013). 
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require its removal by withdrawing approval.”97 Opana was first approved in 2006, 
and then reformulated in 2012.98 The reformulated version, while intended to be 
more resistant to manipulation for misuse, proved to still be easy to inject, and the 
injection of the drug was linked to an HIV and HCV outbreak in Indiana.99 Although 
FDA has not, as of yet, officially withdrawn approval of reformulated Opana,100 
Endo Pharmaceuticals voluntarily stopped marketing the drug in July 2017, and 
FDA’s request that Endo do so represents the agency incorporating non-labeling-
related patient experiences into its drug evaluations.101 
In certain instances, the agency has also incorporated a public health perspective 
into its assessments of drugs that are not controlled substances associated with 
misuse. For example, in its benefit-risk assessment of antibiotics for both animal and 
human use, the agency has long considered the risk that inappropriate use will lead to 
greater antibiotic resistance.102 Resistance can render antibiotics ineffective, and all 
uses of antibiotics, including appropriate uses, contribute to the development of 
resistance by killing the bacteria that are not resistant.103 But inappropriate uses—
such as use in animals for growth promotion rather than for treating infection, use in 
patients who do not have signs of a bacterial infection, or use in patients who fail to 
complete a full course of treatment to eradicate the entire infection—contribute to 
the rise of resistance without offering commensurate health benefits.104 Actions that 
 
97 See Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Requests Removal of Opana ER for Risks Related 
to Abuse (June 8, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm
562401.htm. [https://perma.cc/ZE22-3VQF]. 
98 See id. 
99 See id.; see also FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SUMMARY MINUTES OF THE DRUG SAFETY AND RISK 
MANAGEMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND ANESTHETIC AND ANALGESIC DRUG PRODUCTS ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE JOINT MEETING (Mar. 13–14, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/
CommitteesMeetingMaterials/Drugs/AnestheticAndAnalgesicDrugProductsAdvisoryCommittee/UCM551
226.pdf. [https://perma.cc/75G7-ESFW]. 
100 Nor, as of the time of writing, has FDA determined that reformulated Opana was withdrawn from 
the market for reasons of safety or effectiveness. But given FDA’s June 2017 request, it seems likely FDA 
would make such a determination should a company seek to market a generic version of the drug. 
101 Moreover, there are signs that the agency may take a similar approach for other opioid products 
in the future. For example, in November 2017 FDA sent a complete response letter to Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturing Research Services (PMRS) declining to approve the company’s immediate release 
oxycodone product. After PMRS requested an opportunity for a hearing pursuant to 21 C.F.R. 
§ 314.110(b)(3), FDA published a Federal Register Notice explaining that it declined to approve the drug 
for various reasons, including that “the data submitted were not sufficient to rule out the possibility that 
the proposed formulation could result in a greater proportion of abuse by injection of PMRS’s product 
compared to a conventional IR oxycodone formulation.” Although, as of the time of writing it is not clear 
whether FDA ultimately will refuse to approve the drug, the agency’s reasoning appears similar to that it 
applied to Opana. 83 Fed. Reg. 6196, 6197 (Feb. 13, 2018). 
102 See, e.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 6, 383–84; see also Aaron S. Kesselheim & Kevin Outterson, 
Improving Antibiotic Markets for Long Term Sustainability, 11 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 101, 
113–14 (2011) (describing the ways patient and provider behaviors contribute to resistance). Although the 
agency’s statutory authority for regulating animal drugs differs in some ways from human drugs, the 
approval standard for animal drugs similarly describes the safety and effectiveness of the drugs “under the 
conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof.” 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360b(d)(1)(A). 
103 See Brad Spellberg et al., The Future of Antibiotics and Resistance, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 299, 
299–300 (2013). 
104 See, e.g., Kesselheim & Outterson, supra note 102, at 114; FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Phasing Out 
Certain Antibiotic Use in Farm Animals (2013), https://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/
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the agency has taken based on this risk included attempting, ultimately 
unsuccessfully, to withdraw approval of certain animal antibiotics used for growth 
promotion, issuing guidance on mitigating the risks of resistance associated with 
antibiotic use in animals, and requiring language in the labeling for antibiotics 
intended for human use to encourage judicious prescribing.105 
There are other examples in which FDA incorporates a broad range of evidence 
into certain approval and withdrawal decisions. These include considering the herd 
immunity benefits of vaccines106; FDA’s decision to withdraw approval of certain 
acetaminophen-containing prescription drugs based in part on the risk of liver 
damage when patients do no use the products as directed107; and certain 
considerations for over-the-counter drug approvals, such as studies of their actual, 
rather than intended, use.108 
B. Interpreting the Statutory Standard for Approval 
Although FDA in some instances has incorporated broader, population-level 
information into its assessments of the safety and efficacy of drugs “under the 
conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling,”109 it 
has not clearly described its authority to do so either in the preambles to its 
 
ConsumerUpdates/ucm378100.htm [https://perma.cc/J76D-KFB6]; see also CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
& PREVENTION, ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THREATS IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (2013), 
http://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/threat-report-2013/pdf/ar-threats-2013-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/
K8C4-GW22] (finding that up to fifty percent of antibiotics used in the United States are used 
inappropriately). 
105 See, e.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at, 383–84. 
106 In addition to conferring benefits to the patients who receive vaccines, one well-known public 
health benefit of vaccination is “herd” or “community immunity.” If a large enough portion of the 
population is immunized against a contagious disease, the whole community—including those who are 
not immunized—benefits because the likelihood of an outbreak of the disease is reduced. Consistent with 
this important function of vaccination, FDA-approved labeling for certain vaccines, such as Gardasil (the 
human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine) and the measles, mumps, rubella (MMR) vaccine, includes 
discussion of the population impact of the vaccines—although herd immunity does not appear to have 
been studied as part of the pivotal trials. See, e.g., Gardasil Labeling 21, https://www.fda.gov/downloads/
biologicsbloodvaccines/vaccines/approvedproducts/ucm111263.pdf [https://perma.cc/BT38-82NV]; 
MMR Labeling 3, https://www.fda.gov/downloads/BiologicsBloodVaccines/Vaccines/ApprovedProducts/
UCM123789.pdf [https://perma.cc/DT8M-FASK]. FDA’s decision to approve Gardasil for boys and men 
may provide another indicator that the agency considers the population effects of vaccines. In making that 
decision, the agency appears to have considered both the vaccine’s effectiveness in preventing HPV-
caused genital warts, anal cancer, and certain precancerous lesions in vaccinated boys and men as well as 
the role that boys and men play in transmitting HPV to girls and women. See, e.g., Lurie Presentation, 
supra note 92; cf. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., VACCINE AND RELATED BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE, Transcript of Proceeding at 183 (Sept. 9, 2009) (quoting the Gardasil sponsor as explaining 
that “men play an important role in transmitting HPV to women”), https://wayback.archive-
it.org/7993/20170113080600/http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingM
aterials/BloodVaccinesandOtherBiologics/VaccinesandRelatedBiologicalProductsAdvisoryCommittee/U
CM183640.pdf [https://perma.cc/7EHW-ZTCF]. 
107 See, e.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 384–85; 76 Fed. Reg. 2691 (Jan. 14, 2011). 
108 See, e.g., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: SELF-SELECTION STUDIES FOR 
NONPRESCRIPTION DRUGS (Apr. 2013), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecompliance
regulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm272122.pdf., [https://perma.cc/D8GN-TU3Q]. 
109 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). 
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regulations on new drug applications or to justify individual regulatory actions.110 In 
this Part, we evaluate the agency’s statutory authority to consider such health 
impacts in applying the statutory standard for approval (or withdrawal of a drug’s 
approval), concluding that it, indeed, possesses that authority. 
As a preliminary matter, for the subset of drugs with externalities that are 
controlled substances, the FDCA’s relationship to the CSA is relevant to determining 
the scope of FDA’s authority because “the meaning of one statute may be affected 
by other Acts.”111 In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the Supreme 
Court concluded—based on federal law before the enactment of the 2009 Family 
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (Tobacco Control Act)112—that 
Congress did not intend for FDA to regulate tobacco products in part because 
Congress had “directly addressed the problem of tobacco” through federal legislation 
that did not provide a role for the agency.113 The context for controlled substances is 
quite different. The CSA clearly envisions a role for FDA in regulating controlled 
substances, and, importantly, does not change FDA’s approval standard or the 
agency’s ability to determine independently which controlled substances have met 
that standard.114 
For all drugs with externalities (including controlled substances), the agency’s 
mission—of protecting and promoting the public health by “taking appropriate 
action on the marketing of regulated products”115—and the evolving nature of 
technology and scientific understanding suggest that the FDCA ought to be 
interpreted broadly.116 Under this view, Congress did not intend to “specify every 
detail of regulation” when enacting the FDCA and its numerous amendments.117 
Rather, Congress intended the FDCA to be nimble enough to allow FDA to address 
emerging and evolving technologies and problems.118 For example, as a practical 
matter, it is difficult to imagine that Congress would not want FDA to consider the 
full range of risks associated with drugs such as opioids when making its approval 
decisions.119 
 
110 See, e.g., 50 Fed. Reg. 7452 (Feb. 22, 1985) (final rule for relevant revisions to 21 C.F.R. pt. 
314); 47 Fed. Reg. 46,622 (proposed rule for relevant revisions to 21 C.F.R. pt. 314). 
111 Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000). 
112 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 
(2009). 
113 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 137. 
114 See notes 73–80, supra, and accompanying text. 
115 21 U.S.C. § 393(b). 
116 See, e.g., Peter Barton Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation under the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act, 28 FOOD DRUG COSMETIC L.J. 177, 178 (1973); see also United States v. Article of Drug 
Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798 (1969) (“[R]emedial legislation such as the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act is to be given a liberal construction consistent with the Act’s overriding purpose to protect the public 
health.”); cf. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 63 (2012) (“A textually permissible interpretation that furthers rather than obstructs the document’s 
purpose should be favored.”). 
117 Hutt, supra note 116, at 178. 
118 See id. 
119 Cf. The Federal Response to the Opioid Crisis: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 
(2017) (written testimony on behalf of witnesses from the Department of Health and Human Services) 
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm579512.htm [https://perma.cc/GY3A-T22L]. 
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In addition to this general principle of interpreting the FDCA broadly, through 
considering the FDCA in light of the agency’s public health mission,120 we conclude 
that there are specific legal arguments that support the agency’s authority to consider 
a broad range of evidence in its approval and withdrawal decisions. To be clear, we 
are not arguing that FDA’s approvals are for anything other than the indication in the 
approved labeling, nor should our discussion be viewed as undermining the 
regulatory focus on a product’s intended use. FDA approvals are focused on the 
specific indication in a drug’s proposed labeling because evidence establishing 
effectiveness is typically limited to that indication and a drug’s risks may be 
outweighed by its benefits for one clinical scenario but not for others.121 Likewise, 
there are vital public health rationales for current FDA rules that limit 
pharmaceutical marketing to the specific approved indication such as helping to 
ensure that such marketing is informative and non-misleading, encouraging rigorous 
studies of the safety and effectiveness of new indications, and maintaining the 
integrity of the drug approval framework.122 But in weighing the benefits and risks of 
a drug for an intended use, FDA is not required to ignore the ways that provider and 
patient behaviors—actual use of the drug—influence that weighing for individual 
patients, and for the broader population. 
1. Whole Text 
The Supreme Court has explained that “[s]tatutory construction [ ] is a holistic 
endeavor.”123 This means that a statutory provision should be read to be “compatible 
with the rest of the law,” including its other provisions, its structure, and its 
subsequent amendments124 to “fit, if possible, all parts into a harmonious whole.”125 
Consistent with this idea, the drug approval language in section 505(d) of the FDCA 
cannot be read apart from the rest of the FDCA. Numerous provisions in the FDCA 
contemplate FDA relying on evidence about how a drug is actually used to weigh the 
 
120 See, e.g., Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. at 798. 
121 See, e.g., FDA MEMO, supra note 88, at 7. 
122 See, e.g., FDA MEMO, supra note 88, at 10–11; Nathan Cortez, The Statutory Case Against Off-
Label Promotion, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 124 (2016); Kesselheim, Off-Label Drug Use and 
Promotion, supra note 9, at 231; Joshua M. Sharfstein & Alta Charo, The Promotion of Medical Products 
in the 21st Century: Off-Label Marketing and First Amendment Concerns, 314 JAMA 1795, 1796 (2015). 
But see Coleen Klasmeier & Martin H. Redish, Off-Label Prescription Advertising, the FDA and the First 
Amendment: A Study in the Values of Commercial Speech Protection, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 315, 316 
(2011) (“[I]n many instances [as a result of FDA’s policies on off-label promotion] doctors are likely to be 
deprived of valuable information about important off-label uses that are totally lawful and extremely 
beneficial to some very sick people.”). 
123 United Sav. Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988); 
see also Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) 
(discussing whole-text canon); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 116, at 167 (explaining that statute “must 
be construed as a whole”); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR, PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY, app. B at 2021 (4th 
ed. 2007) (“Statutory interpretation is a ‘holistic’ endeavor.”). 
124 United Sav. Ass’n., 484 U.S. at 371; see also Cortez, supra note 122, at 138–39 (describing the 
whole-text canon). 
125 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133 (quoting FTC v. Mandel Brothers, Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389 
(1959)) (internal quotations omitted). 
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drug’s benefits and risks, including provider and patient behaviors that affect the 
benefit-risk balance.126 
One clear example comes from the requirements for information that must be 
included in a drug’s application and reported after approval. Section 505(b) of the 
FDCA requires that sponsors of new drug applications submit, as part of their 
application, “full reports of investigations which have been made to show whether or 
not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is effective in use” without 
limiting the required information to that about the uses described in the drug’s 
proposed labeling.127 In its regulations, FDA has noted that the type of information 
necessary to make approval decisions varies across drugs,128 and studies and 
information related to misuse of the drug are required specifically for drugs with that 
potential.129 
After approval, section 505(k)(1) requires sponsors to report to FDA any 
information about an approved drug relevant to FDA’s ability to determine whether 
to withdraw approval.130 One requirement that FDA has imposed pursuant to this 
authority is that sponsors must submit “adverse drug experience information” to the 
agency, which includes information about “any” adverse event regardless of whether 
it is associated with a use described in the approved labeling.131 For over-the-counter 
(OTC) drugs marketed under a monograph rather than an approved application, the 
FDCA requires broad reporting of adverse events including those that reflect uses 
not described in the drug’s labeling, such as overdose and misuse.132 
Similarly, in the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) of 
2007, Congress instructed FDA to create a system for proactive post-market 
surveillance of marketed drugs, known as Sentinel.133 The statute requires FDA “to 
provide for active adverse event surveillance” using data from a wide range of 
sources, including electronic health records and insurance claims—sources that 
contain information about how drugs are actually used, not limited to the intended 
uses described in the labeling.134 This provision also required FDA to establish 
standardized procedures for reporting “all serious adverse drug experiences,” 
 
126 Cf. Patricia J. Zettler, The Indirect Consequences of Expanded Off-Label Promotion, 78 OHIO 
STATE L.J. 1053, 1087–88 (2017) (making a similar argument with respect to the agency’s authority to 
consider off-label uses in its approval decisions). 
127 21 U.S.C. § 355(b); see Zettler, Expanded Off-Label Promotion, supra note 126, at 1087 (citing 
the same provision). 
128 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(c). 
129 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(vii). 
130 21 U.S.C. § 355(k). 
131 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(a), (c); see also 44 Fed. Reg. 19,434, 19,434 (Apr. 3, 1979) (explaining that 
adverse experience reporting is required to enable FDA to make determinations about whether there are 
grounds for withdrawing approval). 
132 21 U.S.C. § 379aa. 
133 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3); FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA’s Sentinel Initiative (2017) 
https://www.fda.gov/safety/fdassentinelinitiative/ucm2007250.htm; [https://perma.cc/6TN8-G5W3]; see 
Barbara J. Evans, Authority of the Food and Drug Administration to Require Data Access and Control 
Use Rights in the Sentinel Data Network, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 67, 73–75 (2010) (describing Sentinel); 
Efthimios Parasidis, Patients over Politics: Addressing Legislative Failure in the Regulation of Medical 
Products, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 929, 951 (2011) (describing same). 
134 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3). 
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without restriction, including those that occur from overdose and misuse.135 Thus, in 
requiring FDA to create Sentinel and standardized reporting procedures, Congress 
envisioned FDA monitoring the full range of safety and effectiveness information 
associated with marketed drugs as they are actually used.136 
The recently-enacted 21st Century Cures Act (Cures Act) underscores that an 
expansive range of information is available to FDA when it makes its benefit-risk 
determinations.137 For example, Sections 3001 and 3002 amended the FDCA to 
require that FDA, after approving a new drug, publicly describe the patient 
experience data, if any, that it reviewed and to develop a plan for issuing guidance on 
“the collection of patient experience data, and the use of such data.”138 The law 
defines patient experience data as including information about “the impact 
of . . . a . . . therapy [] on patients’ lives” and “patient preferences with respect to 
treatment.”139 This language appears broad enough to include a wide variety of 
information and in the context of opioids would certainly encompass how using the 
drug is affecting a patient’s family’s well-being.140 Indeed, as of the time of writing, 
FDA is planning to hold a public meeting on patient-focused drug development for 
opioid use disorder (OUD), at which it will be soliciting patient perspectives on the 
“emotional or social effects of OUD,” as well as OUD’s impact on patients’ “ability 
to function in [their] personal . . . life.”141 Additionally, Section 3022 of the Cures 
Act requires FDA to “establish a program to evaluate the potential use of real world 
evidence” in its approval decisions for new indications for already-approved 
drugs.142 Real world evidence is defined as including “data regarding the usage, or 
the potential benefits or risks, of a drug derived from sources other than randomized 
clinical trials.”143 Accordingly, it is likely to include information about how a drug is 
actually used—again suggesting that FDA is authorized to consider a broad range of 
information in its benefit-risk determinations at the time of approval. 
These provisions exemplify how a broad spectrum of information—including 
information about how a drug may be actually prescribed and used by providers and 
patients—will be evaluated by FDA when it is determining whether the standard for 
approval is initially met, and whether drugs continue to meet that standard after 
 
135 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)(C)(i)(II) (emphasis added). 
136 See, e.g., Barbara J. Evans, Seven Pillars of A New Evidentiary Paradigm: The Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act Enters the Genomic Era, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419, 482 (2010); cf. Michael J. 
Malinowski, Doctors, Patients, and Pills-A System Popping Under Too Much Physician Discretion? A 
Law-Policy Prescription to Make Drug Approval More Meaningful in the Delivery of Health Care, 33 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1085, 1121 (2012) (“[FDAAA] expresses a belief that drawing more information from 
the physician-patient experience into the regulatory process with enhanced FDA market presence will 
shore up the reliability of prescription drugs.”). 
137 Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016). 
138 Id. at §§ 3001, 3002. 
139 Id. at § 3001. 
140 Cf. NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 393 (describing the “benefits and risks to members of a 
patient’s household” as something FDA should consider in its regulation of opioids). 
141 83 Fed. Reg. 11,208, 11,209 (Mar. 14, 2018). This Federal Register Notice provides the full list 
of the topics related to patient-focused drug development for OUD on which FDA is soliciting 
information. 
142 Pub. L. No. 114-255 § 3022, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016). 
143 Id. 
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marketing. In the provisions added by the Cures Act, Congress expressly described 
FDA taking a broad perspective on the information relevant to its benefit-risk 
determinations in additional contexts. It seems inconsistent with the FDCA to require 
that sponsors submit such information to FDA, and to authorize FDA to gather such 
information itself through Sentinel, but at the same time prohibit the agency from 
considering that full range of information in making its benefit-risk determinations. 
2. Absurdity 
A second, related argument supporting FDA’s authority to permit use of 
population-level information that it deems relevant to its drug-specific benefit-risk 
determinations comes from the “absurdity doctrine.”144 Under this doctrine, courts 
have departed “from the plain meaning of statutory text when its literal application 
would lead to an ‘absurd’ result” in light of the statutory context.145 Looking at other 
provisions in the FDCA, one could argue that it would be absurd to read the statutory 
standard for approval as limiting FDA to only considering information about the 
safety and effectiveness of a drug when used as described in FDA-approved labeling 
or only by populations described in the approved labeling. 
One could make this argument based on many of the provisions described in the 
previous section. It would be strange to require sponsors submit a wide range of 
information to FDA, including information about drugs arising from uses that depart 
from the approved labeling, while at the same time prohibiting FDA from 
considering that information in its benefit-risk determinations.146 
Another example might come from some of the additional powers granted to FDA 
in FDAAA.147 These drug safety tools include the authority to require a REMS and 
postapproval safety labeling changes, studies, and trials.148 In deciding whether to 
require any of these risk mitigation measures, the FDCA explicitly authorizes FDA 
to consider information about drug uses that depart from those described in the 
approved labeling, and from sources that will include information about how drugs 
are actually used, including Sentinel.149 It would be absurd to permit FDA to impose 
 
144 See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER , supra note 116, at 234; see also Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 
140 F.3d 1060, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“In deciding whether a result is absurd, we consider not only 
whether that result is contrary to common sense, but also whether it is inconsistent with the clear 
intentions of the statute’s drafters—that is, whether the result is absurd when considered in the particular 
statutory context.”). 
145 Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001, 1002 (2006); Mova Pharm. Corp., 140 
F.3d. at 1068; see also United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (“The plain 
meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the ‘rare cases [in which] the literal application of a 
statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.’”); Holy Trinity 
Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 460 (1892) (If a literal construction of the words of a statute be 
absurd, the act must be so construed as to avoid the absurdity.); ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 123, at app. 
B at 20 (“Avoid interpreting a provision in a way inconsistent with the overall structure of the statute or 
with another provision . . . .”). 
146 Cf. Mova Pharma Corp., 140 F.3d at 1068 (connecting “absurdity” to the “statutory context”); 
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 116, at 167 (explaining that the “whole-text doctrine” overlaps with other 
tools of statutory construction). 
147 See Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007); cf. Zettler, Toward Coherent Federal Oversight, 
supra note 8, at 454, 456, 462 (making a similar argument with respect to the agency’s REMS authority 
and its ability to consider off-label uses in its approval decisions). 
148 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(o)(3), (4); 355-1. 
149 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(b) (defining adverse drug experience and new safety information). 
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requirements for studying and mitigating drugs’ risks based on their real-world 
effects, but prohibit the agency from making approval or withdrawal decisions—
which could be characterized as the agency’s most powerful risk mitigation tools—
based on the same information.150 This argument is perhaps strongest for FDA’s 
REMS authority. FDA may require a REMS when necessary to ensure that a drug’s 
benefits outweigh its risks—that is, to ensure that drug meets the approval standard 
in the FDCA.151 If FDA can consider a drug’s real-world effects to determine 
whether a REMS is needed, it would be odd to conclude that FDA cannot consider 
that same information in deciding whether to approve, or withdraw approval of, a 
drug. 
3. Congressional Acquiescence 
The theory of Congressional acquiescence or approval also supports an 
interpretation of the FDCA that permits FDA to take a broad perspective on the 
evidence relevant to its benefit-risk determinations. Although Congressional inaction 
is not generally a good indicator of legislative intent, the Supreme Court has 
explained that “the silence of Congress . . . may sometimes give rise to an 
implication as to the Congressional purpose,” particularly when the interpretation of 
a statute is long-standing and there has been “abundant opportunity” for 
amendments.152 In this case, FDA has had regulations in place since 1985 
interpreting the FDCA as giving the agency “flexibility” in determining what 
information is needed for it to determine whether a drug meets the statutory standard 
for approval.153 Although FDA has not formally interpreted this flexibility as 
encompassing a public health basis for approval decisions, the language is broad 
enough to cover such an approach. Additionally, FDA has implemented a public 
health perspective publicly in specific cases since the regulation was originally 
promulgated.154 Over the past three decades, Congress has had ample opportunity to 
revise the FDCA, with FDA’s authority being amended over 20 times since 1985,155 
and Congress revisiting the FDCA at least every five years since 1992 to re-authorize 
medical product user fees.156 Thus, a court could conclude that Congress has 
 
150 On the other hand, one might also argue that this result would not be absurd, because it makes 
sense for FDA to consider different information in restrictions that fall short of a complete ban on 
marketing. 
151 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a); see Ameet Sarpatwari et al., Using a Drug-Safety Tool to Prevent 
Competition, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1476, 1476–77 (2014) (“REMS requirements have also been hailed 
as a means for the FDA to approve important new drugs that might otherwise have been rejected.”). 
152 See Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 479 (1939); 73 AM. JUR. 2D STATUTES § 82; see also 
Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 155 (2000) (discussing 
Congressional acquiescence); Cortez, supra note 122, at 141–42 (discussing same). 
153 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50(d)(5)(vii), 314.105(c); 50 Fed. Reg. 7452 (Feb. 22, 1985) (final rule for 
relevant revisions to 21 C.F.R. pt. 314). 
154 See Part II.A, supra. 
155 See, e.g., Peter Barton Hutt, The State of Science at the Food and Drug Administration, 60 
ADMIN. L. REV. 431, 467 (2008); FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Milestones in U.S. Food & Drug Law History, 
https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/history/milestones/ucm128305.htm [https://perma.cc/UL8J-
L7LB]. 
156 See, e.g., Jonathan J. Darrow, et al., Speed, Safety and Industry Funding: From PDUFA to the 
FDA Reauthorization Act of 2017, 377 NEW ENGL. J. MED 2278, 2278–80 (2017). 
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acquiesced to FDA’s interpretation of the FDCA as enabling it to consider a wide 
range of evidence in its approval and withdrawal decisions. 
4. Deference 
There are, of course, weaknesses to these arguments that FDA may incorporate 
population health considerations into its benefit-risk determinations for drugs. 
Perhaps most obviously, although the context of the statute cannot be ignored, one 
might nevertheless point to the precise language of the approval standard—
specifying that safety and effectiveness is determined “under the conditions 
prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling.”157 
This language can be compared to the amendments to the FDCA enacted through 
the Tobacco Control Act. The Tobacco Control Act amended the FDCA to give FDA 
jurisdiction over tobacco products, requiring, among other things, pre-market 
authorization for “new tobacco products.”158 The standard for the agency to authorize 
the marketing of a new tobacco product is that marketing it “would be appropriate 
for the protection of the public health,”159 considering “the risks and benefits to the 
population as a whole, including users and nonusers of the tobacco product.”160 
Congress, therefore, can clearly articulate an approval standard that permits FDA to 
incorporate public health considerations into its approval determinations. Because 
such precise language is not found in the drug approval parts of the statute, one 
might argue that Congress did not intend to authorize FDA to apply a similar 
standard to its drug approval (and withdrawal) decisions.161 
But no one canon of statutory interpretation trumps all others, and courts may be 
likely to defer to FDA’s inclination to include considerations such as provider and 
patient behaviors in its benefit-risk determinations for drugs as a reasonable 
interpretation of the FDCA. Under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.,162 courts defer to “permissible” agency interpretations of 
ambiguous statutory provisions.163 In light of the arguments described above, courts 
would have sufficient grounds to conclude that the FDCA is at least ambiguous as to 
the scope of information that FDA may incorporate into its benefit-risk 
determinations for drugs, and that FDA has appropriately interpreted the FDCA as 
giving the agency flexibility in special cases, as set forth in its regulations. Even if 
Chevron was overturned,164 courts may be likely to agree with FDA’s interpretation 
 
157 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE ET AL, supra note 123, app. B at 19 (“Plain meaning rule: follow the plain 
meaning of the statutory text.”); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 116, at 56 (“When deciding an issue 
governed by the text of a legal instrument, the careful lawyer or judge . . . examines the very words of the 
instrument.”). 
158 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 
(2009). 
159 21 U.S.C. § 387j(c)(2)(A). 
160 Id. at § 387j(c)(4). 
161 Cf. Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 216 (2005) (“Congress has included an express 
overt-act requirement in at least 22 other current conspiracy statutes, clearly demonstrating that it knows 
how to impose such a requirement when it wishes to do so.”). 
162 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
163 Id. at 842–43; see also Cortez, supra note 122, at 136–37 (describing the “Chevron two-step”). 
164 See, e.g., Regulatory Accountability Act, H.R. 5, 115th Congress (as passed by House, Jan. 11, 
2017); The Chevron Doctrine: Constitutional and Statutory Questions in Judicial Deference to Agencies: 
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in this instance. Because the FDCA’s “primary objective” is “protect[ing] the public 
health,”165 courts may view an interpretation of the FDCA as authorizing the agency 
to exercise flexibility in what information it deems necessary to analyze the benefits 
and risks of drugs as well-founded.166 
III. IMPLEMENTING FDA’S BROAD AUTHORITY 
Because of the clear and extensive public health harms associated with opioid use 
and misuse, as well as the history of misleading industry marketing, opioids present a 
particularly compelling case for FDA to consider a broad range of evidence, such as 
provider and patient behaviors that affect the benefits and risks of drugs, in its 
regulatory decisions, including approval and withdrawal decisions.167 But FDA’s 
legal authority does not require that the agency limit this approach only to the 
opioids context,168 as there are other drugs for which this approach may be 
necessary.169 
 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016); Examining Agency Use of Deference: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Regulatory Affairs and Federal Management of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2016); Jonathan H. Adler, Restoring Chevron’s Domain, 81 MO. L. 
REV. 983 (2016); Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron: A Literature Review, 16 GEO. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 103 (2018). But see Kristin E. Hickman & Nicholas R. Bednar, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1392 (2017) (“[C]laims that Chevron is in decline are overblown.”). 
165 Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Food & Drug Admin., 484 F. Supp. 1179, 1183 (D. Del. 1980), aff’d, 634 
F.2d 106 (3d Cir. 1980); see United States v. Article of Drug Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798 (1969). 
166 Moreover, some scholars have argued that Chevron did not, in fact, bring about a significant 
change in how frequently agencies prevail in litigation—that is, the standard of review may not affect the 
outcome of challenges to agencies’ practices. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The 
Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to 
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1120 (2008) (“Contrary to the conventional wisdom, Chevron is not the 
alpha and the omega of Supreme Court agency-deference jurisprudence.”); David Zaring, Reasonable 
Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 169 (2010) (reporting a study finding “[c]ourts reverse agencies at roughly 
the same rate, regardless of the standard of review”); cf. Peter H. Schuck and E. Donald Elliott, To the 
Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 985 (1990) 
(finding that agencies prevailed more frequently immediately after Chevron, but that this effect lessened 
over time). But see Adler, supra note 164, at 986 (“Chevron’s significance grew over time.”); Kent 
Barnett and Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2017) (an 
empirical analysis finding that agencies prevail more often in the lower courts when Chevron applies, but 
not at the Supreme Court). Consistent with this view, courts often deferred to FDA’s positions before 
Chevron. See, e.g., United States v. Article of Drug Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 791–92 (1969) (“It is 
enough for us that the expert agency charged with the enforcement of remedial legislation has determined 
that such regulation is desirable for the public health, for we are hardly qualified to second-guess the 
Secretary’s medical judgment.”); United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 553 (1979) (“[T]he 
construction of a statute by those charged with its administration is entitled to substantial deference . . . . 
Such deference is particularly appropriate where, as here, an agency’s interpretation involves issues of 
considerable public controversy, and Congress has not acted to correct any misperception of its statutory 
objectives.”); Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(“The rule that the FDA rather than the courts must first determine the safety and effectiveness of a drug is 
but an extension of the general principle that the agency is usually better equipped by reason of its 
expertise to make the determination than the court.”); cf. Eskridge and Bauer, supra, at 1120 (“[T]he 
Court was highly deferential to agency interpretations before Chevron.”). 
167 See, e.g., Gottlieb & Woodcock, supra note 7; NAS REPORT, supra note 6. 
168 See Part II.B, supra. 
169 See Part II.A, supra; cf. Scott Gottlieb, Reducing the Hurdles for Complex Generic Drug 
Development, FDA VOICE (Oct. 2, 2017), https://blogs.fda.gov/FDAvoice/index.php/2017/10/ 
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Other drugs with the potential for misuse on their own or along with opioids, 
include benzodiazepines approved to treat anxiety and gabapentin (Neurontin), a 
treatment for neuropathic pain.170 But the approach we have outlined may also be 
applicable to drugs without the potential for misuse. For example, appropriate 
prescribing of antimicrobial drugs is essential to minimize the development of 
resistant bacteria that can then infect others, while vaccines provide benefits to the 
population through “herd immunity” apart from their benefits for individual 
patients.171 Any prescription drug with common “off-label” uses—for indications not 
formally reviewed and approved by FDA—that substantially alter its population-
level benefit-risk profile might be viewed as having externalities. As one example, 
drugs approved for dementia, narcolepsy, and attention deficit disorders have 
received attention for their potentially dangerous off-label uses as cognitive 
enhancers in healthy individuals.172 As another example, we might expect a highly 
effective weight loss drug approved for patients with obesity or severe obesity to be 
used widely outside of that patient population, because of the social stigma 
associated with being even moderately overweight.173 If use of such drugs outside of 
severely obese patients becomes commonplace, whether or not actively encouraged 
by the pharmaceutical manufacturer—as occurred in the 1990s with the use of 
fenfluramine/phentermine174—it may alter the population-level benefit-risk profile of 
the drug, because these patients are not at the same risk of adverse health outcomes. 
Thus, there are a variety of drugs and drug classes for which FDA could 
incorporate a wide range of evidence in its benefit-risk determinations, including 
how patients and providers actually use a drug. Yet it is not clear precisely when and 
how the agency will do so in its approval and withdrawal decisions. Accordingly, in 
this Part, we offer some considerations for systematically and sensibly assessing the 
benefits and risks of drugs with externalities. Although not a comprehensive list of 
all considerations for, or practical consequences of, implementation,175 these 
 
[https://perma.cc/T2CK-39BF] (describing drug prices as a “public health concern that FDA should 
address”). 
170 See, e.g., Xanax (alprazolam) Labeling, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs
/label/2016/018276s052lbl.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJ57-9BVK]; Carmen Heredia Rodriguez, New on the 
Streets: Drug for Nerve Pain Boosts High for Opioid Abusers, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 6, 2017), 
https://khn.org/news/new-on-the-streets-drug-for-nerve-pain-boosts-high-for-opioid-abusers 
[https://perma.cc/3R65-XDUM]. 
171 See, e.g., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Battle of the Bugs, supra note 10; Vaccines.gov, Community 
Immunity (“Herd Immunity”), https://www.vaccines.gov/basics/protection/index.html [https://perma.cc/
QG2L-VUNU]. 
172 See, e.g., Martha J. Farah et al., Neurocognitive Enhancement: What Can We Do and What 
Should We Do?, 5 NATURE REV. NEUROSCIENCE 421 (2004). 
173 Cf. Zettler, Expanded Off-Label Promotion, supra note 126, at 1089 (describing a similar 
example). 
174 See, e.g., Steven R. Salbu, The FDA and Public Access to New Drugs: Appropriate Levels of 
Scrutiny in the Wake of HIV, AIDS, and the Diet Drug Debacle, 79 B.U. L. REV. 93, 124 (1999). 
175 As one example, systematically incorporating population health information into approval 
decisions for certain drugs may alter industry’s willingness to develop potentially beneficial drugs or drug 
classes if they also have the potential for significant externalities—particularly if evaluating population 
health information significantly lengthens the time necessary to develop a drug or is perceived as doing so. 
Cf. Yaniv Heled, Regulatory Competitive Shelters, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 299, 301 (2015) (describing the “goal 
of creating incentives for innovation in pharmaceuticals and production of socially valuable data”). 
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suggestions are intended to aid in thoughtful administration of the agency’s authority 
to take a public health perspective in its approval and withdrawal decisions. 
A. When to Implement 
Consistent with its statutory authority, current regulations, and public health 
mission,176 FDA can, and should, incorporate all relevant evidence into its benefit-
risk determinations whenever warranted by the particular drug or drug class that the 
agency is reviewing. This approach will not be necessary or helpful for all drugs. 
FDA’s traditional approach to assessing the benefits and risks of drugs, focused on 
the clinical trials of their intended uses as described in FDA-approved labeling, 
works well for many drugs. Apart from situations such as opioids—in which there is 
widespread recognition of the drugs’ population health impacts, including in FDA 
regulations and guidance,177 and of the influence that misleading marketing may 
have had on prescribing decisions—there may be considerable disagreement about 
when a drug or drug class can be adequately evaluated through the conventional 
approach, or, instead, has the potential to impact population health such that FDA 
must consider a wider body of evidence. 
Furthermore, it may be difficult for the agency to articulate general guidelines 
about when it will implement a broad approach that are not specific to a drug product 
or class. FDA regulations explain only that it must “exercise its scientific judgment” 
in determining the information necessary to assess a drug’s benefits and risks.178 In a 
preamble, the agency further explained that “applications for new members of an 
established class of drugs should take into account experience gained with that 
class . . . This may involve, for example, more detailed safety data if marketing 
experience with the class has revealed special safety concerns.”179 But beyond these 
statements, there is little public information about when the agency will incorporate 
broader information into its decision-making. 
There, however, may be a few steps the agency could take to help ensure a 
consistent application of its authority to incorporate population health impacts into 
its decision-making, and clarify its thinking for stakeholders. First, FDA should be 
consistent, treating like cases alike. Such consistency is necessary under the 
Administrative Procedures Act, which authorizes courts to set aside arbitrary and 
capricious agency actions,180 and is good policy.181 It is fair to, and provides 
 
176 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 393(b); 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(c). 
177 See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 314.50; FOOD & DRUG. ADMIN., Guidance for Industry: Abuse-Deterrent 
Opioids – Evaluation and Labeling (Apr. 2015), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/
UCM334743.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JKX-N67V]. 
178 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(c). 
179 50 Fed. Reg. 7452, 7483 (Feb. 22, 1985). 
180 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Etelson v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 684 F.2d 918, 926 (D.C. Cir. 
1982); see also Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Shalala, 963 F. Supp. 20, 27 (D.D.C. 1997) (“[FDA] must treat 
similar cases in a similar manner unless it can provide a legitimate reason for failing to do so.”). 
Consistency may also make courts more likely to defer to the agency’s positions. See, e.g., Christopher J. 
Walker, How to Win the Deference Lottery, 91 TEX. L. REV. 73, 80 (2013). 
181 See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, Therapeutic Orphans, Pediatric Victims? The Best Pharmaceuticals for 
Children Act and Existing Pediatric Human Subject Protection, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 661, 680 (2003); 
Yoav Dotan, Making Consistency Consistent, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 995, 999 (2005); Miranda Oshige 
McGowan, Against Interpretation, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 711, 724 (2005); Laurens Walker & John 
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predictability for, regulated entities, and demonstrates rational decision-making.182 If 
generalizable principles do emerge through the agency’s experience, FDA should 
issue guidance on how it will consistently implement its “flexibility” in applying the 
approval standards for drugs.183 
As part of the numerous communications that FDA schedules with manufacturers 
during the drug development process,184 FDA also should communicate to a drug’s 
manufacturer the range of evidence it will need to assess a particular drug’s benefits 
and risks as early as possible, so that the manufacturer has sufficient notice of the 
agency’s expectations. For some drugs, such as novel opioids that are likely to be 
associated with the same risks as currently-marketed opioids, this will be clear early 
in drug development, perhaps even before the drug’s clinical trials begin.185 For other 
drugs, the need for a broad range of evidence may not become apparent until later in 
development, or after approval when it is known how the drug is actually used by 
providers and patients and new risks emerge.186 
To help all regulated entities understand FDA’s thinking in this area, the agency 
could make public what has triggered a need for population health impact 
information about a particular drug or drug class, and what kind of information or 
data is needed, as early as the law allows such transparency.187 This would be 
concordant with ongoing work at FDA to improve transparency, as well as a growing 
consensus about the importance of transparency among regulators in other countries 
and the biomedical community generally.188 FDA also could use its advisory 
committees to help the agency decide whether a public health perspective is needed 
 
Monahan, Scientific Authority: The Breast Implant Litigation and Beyond, 86 VA. L. REV. 801, 821 
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182 See, e.g., id.; see also Patricia J. Zettler et al., Closing the Regulatory Gap for Synthetic Nicotine 
Products, 59 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (making a similar argument), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3045317. 
183 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(c) (“FDA makes its views on drug products and classes of drugs available 
through guidance documents, recommendations, and other statements of policy.”). 
184 See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 314.102(a) (“During the course of reviewing an application[,] . . . FDA 
shall communicate with applicants about scientific, medical, and procedural issues that arise . . . .”); 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-01-01-00590, FDA’S REVIEW 
PROCESS FOR NEW DRUG APPLICATIONS (Mar. 2003) (“FDA works collaboratively with sponsors.”). 
185 See, e.g., NAS Report, supra note 6, at 392–96; 50 Fed. Reg. 7452, 7483 (Feb. 22, 1985). 
186 FDA, policymakers, and scholars acknowledge that many drugs are associated with risks that do 
not become apparent until after approval. See, e.g., INST. OF MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: 
PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 38 (2007) [hereinafter “IOM DRUG SAFETY 
REPORT”]; Nicholas S. Downing et al., Postmarket Safety Events Among Novel Therapeutics Approved by 
the US Food and Drug Administration Between 2001 and 2010, 317 JAMA 1854 (2017); Parasidis, supra 
note 133, at 949. 
187 See, e.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 9, 400, 412 (describing a “commitment to transparency” 
as necessary in FDA regulation of opioids). 
188 See, e.g., Afia K. Asamoah & Joshua M. Sharfstein, Transparency at the Food and Drug 
Administration, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2341 (2010); Peter Lurie et al., Comparison of Content of FDA 
Letters Not Approving Applications for New Drugs and Associated Public Announcements from Sponsors: 
Cross Sectional Survey, 350 BRITISH MED. J. h2758 (2015); Joshua M. Sharfstein and Michael Stebbins, 
Enhancing Transparency at the US Food and Drug Administration: Moving Beyond the 21st Century 
Cures Act, 317 JAMA 1621 (2017); Joshua M. Sharfstein et al., Blueprint for Transparency at the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration: Recommendations to Advance the Development of Safe and Effective 
Medical Products, 45 J. L. MED. ETHICS 7 (2017). 
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for a particular drug, to incorporate population health information into its benefit-risk 
determination, or both. Because advisory committee meetings must be public,189 
routinely seeking advisory committee advice would also promote transparency and 
public accountability. 
Even if FDA is transparent about the data needed for approval as early as possible, 
explicitly taking a public health approach may spark concerns that the agency is 
slowing the approval process.190 But, because the public health approach would be 
applied to approval (and withdrawal) decisions for only for those drug products and 
classes that have population health impacts that affect their benefit-risk profiles—
such as opioids—concerns about generalized changes to the approval process are not 
merited. Moreover, we are not arguing that FDA should refuse to approve, or 
withdraw approval of, any particular drug product or drug class subject to additional 
analysis of their social or clinical externalities.191 If it determines that the benefit-risk 
profile still merits approval, FDA first could turn to risk mitigation tools, such as 
REMS, to address such externalities.192 Indeed, FDA is reportedly currently in the 
process of revising the REMS for extended release opioids, and has expanded REMS 
requirements to also apply to immediate release opioids.193 Similarly, before FDA 
requested that Endo Pharmaceuticals remove Opana ER from the market,194 the 
agency likely considered whether the REMS could have been changed to sufficiently 
mitigate the drug’s risks.195 In those instances, such as for Opana ER, in which other 
risk mitigation tools are not sufficient to address the population health impacts of a 
 
189 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 10(a). 
190 Cf. Leah Isakov et al., Is the FDA Too Conservative or Too Aggressive?: A Bayesian Decision 
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decisions, may have unintended consequences. For example, the approval of abuse deterrent formulations 
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opioids such as heroin. See, e.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 6. The potential for such indirect 
consequences may need to be part of regulatory decisions for particular drugs or drug classes. 
192 See, e.g., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: SAFETY LABELING CHANGES 3 
(July 2013), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/
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193 See, e.g., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) for Opioid 
Analgesics (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/
ucm163647.htm [https://perma.cc/8Z3F-4YUV]. 
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195 Cf. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Summary Minutes of the Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory 
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particular product or drug class, the agency can, and should, take into account those 
population health impacts in its approval and withdrawal decisions in a fair and 
transparent manner. 
B. Obtaining Data Necessary for Implementation 
If FDA were to determine that additional information about a drug’s public health 
impacts is necessary, it also needs to consider how that information should be 
obtained. Randomized, controlled trials (RCTs) will continue to be the gold-standard 
for evaluating the benefits and risks of all drugs, including those with population 
health impacts. But obtaining the data and information about public health impacts, 
including how provider and patient behaviors affect a drug’s benefits and risks is, of 
course, critical for enabling FDA to incorporate such information into its decision-
making, and traditional RCTs may be insufficient to assess such factors.196 For 
example, the agency may need to understand the risks associated with patients who 
use opioids or other drugs of misuse and then transition to illicit drugs, the sort of 
question that is not readily addressed in a randomized prospective trial.197 For 
example, in July 2017, the agency held a public workshop to discuss methods for 
studying the effects of abuse-deterrent formulations of opioids.198 
Accordingly, other methods for understanding the benefit-risk profiles of drugs 
with externalities should be developed. Although assessing the risk-benefit profiles 
of drugs through means other than traditional RCTs may seem like a significant shift 
in how Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) has historically operated, 
it is consistent with ongoing efforts at CDER.199 Indeed, in some, and perhaps many, 
instances, CDER may be able to obtain the data and information that it needs to 
assess population health impacts of drugs through initiatives that are already 
underway. Sentinel, and the incorporation of real-world evidence and patient 
experience data into its drug and device regulation, are sources that are likely to 
provide the agency useful information about the population health impacts of drugs, 
including those associated with provider and patient behaviors.200 
 
196 Cf. Laura E. Bothwell et al., Assessing the Gold Standard—Lessons from the History of RCTs, 
374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2175 (2016) (discussing strengths and limitations of RCTs); Thomas R. Frieden, 
Evidence for Health Decision Making—Beyond Randomized, Controlled Trials, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
465, 466 (2016) (asserting that the limitations in RCTs “do[] not suggest that the Food and Drug 
Administration should be less stringent in their review of drug safety and efficacy, but rather that there 
should be rigorous review of all potentially valid data sources”). 
197 See, e.g., NAS Report, supra note 6, at 388–409. 
198 See, e.g., 82 Fed. Reg. 27,271 (June 14, 2017). 
199 See, e.g., Nina L. Hunter et al., Flexibility in the FDA Approach to Orphan Drug Development 16 
NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 737, 738 (2017) (describing FDA’s use of real-world evidence to 
overcome limitations of RCTs in the context of orphan drugs); Riley, supra note 8, at 311–12 (describing 
FDA’s as “allow[ing] increased flexibility” in clinical trial design in the context of precision medicine); cf. 
IOM DRUG SAFETY REPORT, supra note 186, at 4 (describing the limited safety information provided by 
pre-approval and recommending that FDA take a “lifecycle” approach to drug regulation). 
200 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. 355(k)(3); 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, §§ 3001, 3022, 130 
Stat. 1033, 1083–84, 1096–98 (2016); FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA 
STAFF: USE OF REAL-WORLD EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING FOR MEDICAL 
DEVICES (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/
guidancedocuments/ucm513027.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XL5-Q8JM]; FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Enhancing 
Benefit-Risk Assessment in Regulatory Decision-Making (2017), https://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/
UserFees/PrescriptionDrugUserFee/ucm326192.htm [https://perma.cc/P29M-52L6]; Evans, supra note 
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To gain a full picture, FDA may also need to develop new sources of data and 
information designed to address questions about the population health impacts of 
drugs.201 Such an effort would be consistent with FDA’s ongoing regulatory science 
initiative, which aims to encourage the development of new approaches to 
understanding the safety and effectiveness of drugs and other FDA-regulated 
products.202 Particularly relevant to understanding the public health impact of certain 
drug products and classes may be the agency’s aim of “harness[ing] diverse data” to 
assess products, which includes the goal of developing new data sources and 
innovative approaches for monitoring drugs and other medical products throughout 
their lifecycles.203 In addition to encouraging better methods for understanding the 
public health impacts of certain drugs through its regulatory science initiative, the 
agency also may be able to draw on its evolving experience with studying and 
evaluation the population health impacts of new tobacco products, to inform how the 
methods used to undertake a similar evaluation of drug products and classes.204   
C. Limits on Implementation 
Although FDA must consider evidence about public health implications to 
adequately assess certain drugs and drug classes, expressly expanding the kinds of 
evidence that the agency considers in evaluating drugs may raise concerns about 
enabling the government to advance social or political positions under the guise of 
public health.205 Indeed, there is a history of the government using public health 
authorities and rationales to achieve other ends,206 which, arguably, includes FDA. 
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203 See id. 
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FDA’s “bungl[ed]” handling of access to levonorgestrel (Plan B), an emergency 
contraceptive, provides one example.207 In 1999 FDA initially approved Plan B for 
prescription use. In 2001 the Center for Reproductive Rights filed a Citizen Petition 
requesting that FDA move the drug to over-the-counter status, and the manufacturer 
also submitted a supplement requesting the switch to over-the-counter status.208 
Despite robust data, an advisory committee recommendation that the drug be 
switched to over-the-counter status, and career agency staff’s assessment that the 
evidence supported the switch, it took over 10 years, and protracted litigation, before 
the drug became widely available over-the-counter without proof of a purchaser’s 
age because of political interference from two different administrations.209 As 
another example, a recently filed lawsuit argues that certain REMS requirements for 
mifepristone (Mifeprex), a drug used for pregnancy termination, are not merited by 
the benefit-risk profile of the drug.210 Although at the time of writing the outcome of 
that litigation remains to be seen, as in the Plan B context, the plaintiffs argue that 
there are ample data supporting the conclusion that mifepristone is safe for use 
without the REMS requirements and that FDA staff have concluded as much—
implying that the REMS requirements instead reflect the political controversy around 
abortion.211 
It is not difficult to imagine how social or political considerations similarly could 
commingle with FDA’s regulatory decision-making on other drugs and drug classes 
in the process of implementing a public health regulatory perspective. Apart from 
opioids, other drugs for which this regulatory approach is relevant are also connected 
to controversial political and social topics. These include other drugs of misuse212 
and drugs for pre-exposure prophylaxis for HIV,213 which both are associated with 
stigma, and drugs that can be used for cognitive enhancement, which are associated 
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with various social concerns including about “cheating,” producing “unnatural” 
results, and undermining individual responsibility.214 
The line between political and public health concerns is not always clear. For 
example, one concern raised about using drugs for cognitive enhancement is that 
once such use becomes the norm in some groups, others, who might not have 
otherwise chosen to use drugs for cognitive enhancement, will feel pressured to do 
so.215 Widespread use of cognitive enhancing drugs implicates both public health 
concerns—about the safety and effectiveness of the drugs for that use—but also 
concerns about whether such expansive use is socially desirable.216 
Although the line between public health, and social or political, considerations 
may not always be distinct, FDA should strive to focus solely on questions of public 
health.217 This is consistent both with the limits of the agency’s institutional 
competence, and its statutory authority. Tying regulatory decisions to sound data 
regarding the public health effects of the drugs at issue may be one way to help the 
agency keep an appropriate scope to its review. 
CONCLUSION 
Often FDA’s drug approval and withdrawal decisions are understood to be 
focused on the benefits and risks as defined in the preapproval clinical trials, which 
generally do not capture broader, population-level considerations, such as the ways 
in which provider and patient behaviors—actual use of the drug—may alter a drug’s 
safety or effectiveness. For many drugs, this approach works well. But for some 
drugs with particularly problematic population health impacts, including those 
associated with provider and patient behaviors such as opioids, it is necessary for 
FDA to look beyond its traditional mode for making benefit-risk determinations, and 
apply a public health approach. This Article describes FDA’s authority to consider a 
wide range of data and information in determining whether a drug’s benefits 
outweigh its risks, including patient and provider behaviors, both for drugs of misuse 
as well as other drugs with externalities. Given this broad authority, as FDA 
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intensifies its efforts to address the risks associated with opioid misuse,218 the lessons 
learned from regulating opioids—including the need for consistency, developing 
new methods for assessing drug risks and benefits, and limiting the agency to matters 
of safety and effectiveness—should be extended beyond opioids to other drugs with 
externalities. 
 
218 See, e.g., Gottlieb, FDA Takes Important Steps to Stem the Tide of Opioid Misuse and Abuse, 
supra note 70. 
